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PARTICIPATORY GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNAL PROP-
ERTY: TWO RADICAL CONCEPTS IN THE VIRGINIA
CHARTER OF 1606
Finbarr McCarthy*
On April 26, 1607, about one hundred English men landed on
the Atlantic shore of North America near Jamestown, Virginia.
There they established the foundation for what would become
the first permanent English colony in America. These men, and
the men and women who followed in the next decade, left as
their legacy a society that combined a rudimentary form of
popular government with a system of private property. But
these settlers established that society only after conducting
seventeen turbulent years of social experiments. Had those
experiments conducted in that Virginia swamp turned out dif-
ferently, we might now live under a very different governmen-
tal regime.
Until the Virginia Company was dissolved in 1624, settlers
tried four radically different ways of governing their colony and
arranging property relations within it. Initially, in accordance
with their charter, the settlers pursued radically participatory
schemes. A local council chosen from among the settlers gov-
erned both civil and criminal affairs. The settlers held property
communally. Nobody could own private property. However, with
the survival of the colony threatened, a second charter, issued
in London in 1609, replaced the local council with an autocratic
governor. Property still remained communal. A third regime
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appeared in 1614 which retained an autocratic local government
but permitted limited private ownership of land. Only in the fi-
nal phase of initial colonization did a popular assembly and the
concept of private property concurrently appear. This fourth
combination endured, serving as the template for the develop-
ment of the English North American colonies.
In this paper, I explore the legal, political, and economic
forces that explain the truly radical choice for the first regime--
government by local council and communal property.' I do not
trace the evolution of the four regimes that characterize the
period 1607-1624. Instead, I focus on the background to coloni-
zation and the positive law enacted for the colony. My analysis
concentrates on what the proponents of colonization wanted to
happen as opposed to what actually did happen in Jamestown.
Besides enriching the story of America's roots, a study of this
nature has both theoretical and practical consequences. Case
studies serve to ground legal theory, as Robert Ellickson has
noted.2 They provide historical evidence that may inform theo-
retical debates on government and property that too often occur
in an ahistorical context. Such studies might, for instance, indi-
cate how, within an economic system or individual enterprise,
particular allocations of property rights affect the organization's
ability to achieve its goals.
Case studies may also aid in discussions of problems in East-
ern Europe and South Africa. For example, the Jamestown
venture experimented with ownership structures. This venture
may, therefore, indicate the advantages and limitations of vari-
ous property systems in organizing and motivating people to
achieve common objectives. The insights gained may be useful
to emerging democracies in Eastern Europe struggling to struc-
ture property relations within participatory systems of govern-
ment. The insights may also be useful to South African commu-
1. The primary materials relied on throughout this article are collected in 1-2
JAMESTOWN VOYAGES UNDER THE FIRST CHARTER, 1606-1609 (Phillip L. Barbour ed.,
2d ser. 1969) [hereinafter JAMESTOWN VOYAGES] and in 1 THE GENESIS OF THE
UNITED STATES 206-37 (Alexander Brown ed., 1964) [hereinafter GENESIS]. Note that
in quotations to the original sources I have modernized the spelling and punctuation.
2. Robert Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1319 (1993).
3. Id.
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nities concerned that communal rights established under cus-
tomary law may disappear in the new republic.
In the first part of the article, I sketch the broad background
against which planning for colonization occurred. By analyzing
the documents drafted for the venture, I explore how their legal
and imaginative elements projected the reassuring vision of an
ordered world in Virginia. I also discuss the role of legal figures
in initiating colonization.
In the second part, I examine the novel two-council structure
used for governing the venture. I argue that the drafters
thought of the colony as if it were a municipal borough for two
potentially conflicting purposes. First, to attract settlers a local
council assured potential settlers that they could influence mat-
ters most immediately affecting them. Second, to protect inves-
tors a local council, chosen by a council in London, permitted
greater control of colonial affairs than the political climate in
England would otherwise have tolerated.
Finally, in the third part, I explain that the planners chose a
communal property regime because they thought it best protect-
ed the interests of the investors. The communal format was,
however, likely to encounter difficulties because in selecting it,
the planners inadequately considered the settlers' interests.
Moreover, the communal format conflicted with the emerging
conception of property relations, particularly in land, that most
English people possessed.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Most English people who ventured abroad in the sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries did so for commercial or reli-
gious reasons.4 They were traders, diplomats, privateers and
sailors. Some were pilgrims; others were fleeing religious perse-
cution. Few journeyed for pleasure, curiosity, or knowledge.5
4. 1 CHARLES M. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 45-65
(1934).
5. Learned men such as Francis Bacon, Lord High Chancellor from 1617 until
1621, increasingly advocated foreign travel for educational purposes. "Travel," declared
Bacon, "in the younger sort, is a part of Education; in the elder, a part of experi-
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Typically, they travelled to fairly populous parts of the globe
that Western Europeans knew well. English trading companies,
for instance, had focused almost exclusively on countries in
Europe or along the African coasts.6 Certainly many of these
ventures had been expensive and often dangerous. Voyages in
the small wooden vessels of the period were extremely hazard-
ous.' In addition, travel increased exposure to diseases.8 Final-
ly, pirates posed a threat to safe voyage.9
For those sailing to "Virginia" in 1606, all these dangers were
magnified.10 In committing "to make habitation, plantation and
ence." Francis Bacon, Of Travaile, in THE ESSAYS OR COUNSELS CIVIL AND MORALL 73
(Walter Worrall ed., 1900) [hereinafter THE ESSAYS].
6. Susan M. Kingsbury, A Comparison of the Virginia Company with the Other
English Trading Companies of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, in 1 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1906, at 161, 162-
63 (1908).
7. On a voyage to Virginia in 1609, thirty-two people died and had to be thrown
overboard. Letter from M. Gabriel Archer (1609), in 2 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra
note 1, at 279-80.
8. Within eight months of establishing the colony at Jamestown, 66 of the 104
original settlers died. Most died from diseases such as dysentery and typhoid fever.
See WYNDHAM B. BLANTON, MEDICINE IN VIRGINIA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
(1972); JOHN DUFFY, EPIDEMICS IN COLONIAL AMERICA 215, 223 (1953).
9. One author described the threat posed by pirates:
For a very long period after English commerce began to penetrate the
Mediterranean, those who wished to trade successfully in the region could
do so only to the degree that they could command the naval power to
ward off the attacks of successive generations of predators, from the
Turks and Barbary pirates in the middle of the sixteenth century, to the
Spanish in the latter part of the sixteenth century, to the North Africa-
based multinational pirate communities in the first half of the seven-
teenth century.
ROBERT BRENNER, MERCHANTS AND REVOLUTION: COMMERCIAL CHANGE, POLITICAL
CONFLICT, AND LONDON'S OVERSEAS TRADERS, 1550-1653, at 47 (1993); see also RICH-
ARD S. LAMBERT, THE FORTUNATE TRAVELLER: A SHORT HISTORY OF TOURING AND
TRAVEL FOR PLEASURE 42 (1950).
10. The charter of 1606 defined Virginia expansively as the land between the
thirty-fourth and the forty-fifth degrees of north latitude. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES,
supra note 1, at 24. In other words, it covered roughly the area between today's
Canadian border and the Cape Fear River in North Carolina.
However, when the text in this section uses the name Virginia, it means, un-
less the context clearly indicates otherwise, the "first" or more southern colony which
was to inhabit between 34 and 41 degrees north latitude.
All those who sailed in 1606 were male. Moreover, the records indicate that
only men were involved in planning the venture. Consequently, I use "men" and the
male pronoun throughout my article.
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to deduce a colony," aspiring settlers exposed themselves to
more physical dangers." Creating a colony also dramatically
increased the organizational, financial, legal, and emotional bur-
dens imposed upon all participating in the venture. It called for
greater organizational abilities than did mere trading voyages.
Colonization required greater skill in long-term planning and it
demanded a larger initial outlay of capital than did the usual
expedition. Colonizing also required a continuous flow of sub-
stantial capital for an undefined period thereafter. Because
immediate profits were unlikely, it also demanded great pa-
tience from reluctant investors. Furthermore, unlike the usual
overseas ventures of the time, colonizing also involved recruit-
ing, selecting, outfitting, transporting and supplying settlers.
From the settlers it demanded both courage and fortitude. But
one feature, in particular, distinguished colonizing from other
expensive overseas ventures. Colonization required a plan of
governance for ordering affairs not only in the colony, but also
between the colony and England.
A. The Initiating Documents
The plan for governing the venture appears in what I term
the initiating or enabling documents. These documents included
the "Letters Patent" of April 1606 (the first charter) and the
closely related "Articles, instructions and orders ... for the
good order and government of the two several colonies... "
11. Id. An earlier attempt to found a colony at Roanoke (present-day North Car-
olina) failed. See generally 1-2 THE ROANOKE VOYAGES 1584-1590: DOCUMENTS TO
ILLUSTRATE THE ENGLISH VOYAGES TO NORTH AMERICA UNDER THE PATENT GRANTED
TO WALTER RALEIGH IN 1584 (David B. Quinn ed., 1952) [hereinafter THE ROANOKE
VOYAGES]. Earlier expeditions had to bear the financial burden of building residences
abroad. 1 WILLIAmi R. SCOTT, THE CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH, SCOTrSH
AND IRISH JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720, at 22 (1912). However, that burden
hardly compared to the ones colonizing imposed.
At the time, "plantation" meant "the settlement of persons in some locality;
especially the planting of a colony; colonization," or "a settlement in a new or con-
quered country, a colony." 11 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 976 (1989). For a
discussion of what the English meant by plantation in Ireland in the late sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, their model for Virginia, see R.F. FOSTER, MODERN IRE-
LAND 1600-1972, at 59-78 (1988). See generally Francis Bacon, Plantations, in THE
ESSAYS, supra note 5, at 144-48, and in BARON OF VERULAN VISCOUNT SAINT ALBANS,
CIVIL AND MORAL OF FRANCIS BACON 110-13 (1994).
1995]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:327
which the Crown issued on November 20, 1606.12 In the histo-
ry of this earliest period of colonial Virginia, only one aspect of
these documents has received more than scant attention. That
aspect is the claim in the charter that the English were legally
and morally entitled to Virginia.13 Otherwise, most historians
only perfunctorily mention the existence of the documents.
Some occasionally quote a provision. However, such treatment
implies that these initiating documents were mere formulaic
restatements of conventional legal strategies. This view under-
estimates the complex context of their writing. Such treatment
also ignores the significance of the documents in attempting to
shape behavior in the colony. Finally, this treatment underesti-
mates how legal institutions shape history, particularly
Virginia's history.
Like most legal constructs, the initiating documents served as
instruments for imposing a particular vision of order. They
authorized who could travel, 4 to what destination, by what
12. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 24-44; see also 1 GENESIS, supra
note 1, at 46-85. Two other important documents were also issued late in 1606 in the
wake of the "Letters Patent" and the "Instructions." The King's Council of Virginia,
which the "Letters Patent" directed be established for the "superior managing and
direction" of affairs in the colony, issued the "Certain Orders and Directions . .. "
and the "Instructions given by way of advice ... " 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra
note 1, at 45-54.
13. For works that discuss these claims, see ROBERT A. WiLiAms, JR., THE AMERI-
CAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990);
Wilcomb E. Washburn, The Moral and Legal Justification for Dispossessing the Indi-
ans, in SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA: ESSAYS IN COLONIAL HISTORY 15-32 (James
M. Smith ed., 1959); Nicholas Canny, The Ideology of English Colonization: From
Ireland to America, 30 WM. & MARY Q. 575, 579 (1973); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The
Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of the American, Indian in Western
Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1983).
14. The provisions in the documents were not the only legal impediments to trav-
el. Within England, the changing nature of property relations was a factor generating
movement in pursuit of better economic opportunities. That movement sparked great
fear of unemployed vagrants. Seeking to address this fear, legislation such as the
Statute of Artificers, enacted in 1563, required people to stay "in the locality and in
the work into which they were born." B.A. HOLDERNESS, PRE-INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND:
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, 1500-1750, at 194 (1976). "[L]aborers and artisans" who left
their parish had "to have testimonials from their last employers . .. and they could
not obtain fresh employment without presenting such letters." W. CUNNINGHAM, THE
GROWTH OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE IN MODERN TIMES 29 (1912). Most of
these statutes failed for reasons that I will discuss later in the text.
Since the reign of King Richard II, travel abroad required permission of the
monarch. Though King James I rescinded that requirement, he could prevent any
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route, with what goods, and for what purposes. 5 They sought
to fix relationships in the colony among the colonists and be-
tween them and the Indians. Like all legal instruments, the
documents established privileges, rights, claims, and duties.
They sought to direct behavior in certain preferred channels.
They provided mechanisms to settle disputes. They declared
how to punish transgressors. They also addressed the broader
relationships among the colonists, the Crown, and the investors
in England. Consequently, the initiating documents substantial-
ly determined who confronted the dangers of colonizing and
who would ultimately profit from the undertaking. They also
determined who was entitled first to construct and later to
interpret the reality that the journey became. In short, the
initiating documents provided the framework within which the
entire venture and its story played.
But the documents were more than legal constructs. Their
content, form, and language reflected the considerable extent to
which the documents were also instruments of their drafters'
imagination. Circumstances forced the documents to be imagi-
native since the English knew little about colonizing or of
America. They could draw upon their largely unsuccessful expe-
rience with Irish plantations under Elizabeth .16 They could
also draw upon lessons learned from the Spanish'7 and the
emigration "on grounds of public safety." Harold Laski, The Early History of the Cor-
poration in England, 30 HARV. L. REV. 561, 585 (1917).
15. To trade overseas, a subject needed a royal license. JOHN H. BAKER, AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 512 (1990). "By 1603 all the regions of trade
to which the English sailed were subject to company regulation." HOLDERNESS, supra
note 14, at 185. Only merchants allied with the chartered companies to which the
Crown had granted a monopoly could trade with, for instance, Russia, Turkey, Venice,
the Levant, and the East Indies. BRENNER, supra note 9, at 92.
That legal barriers excluded many potential merchants can be deduced from the
consequences of their removal. When the trading privileges of the Merchant Adventur-
ers were suspended from 1624 to 1634, "independent producers flooded into the trade,
resulting in a threefold increase in the total number of traders." Id. at 85.
16. See ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 68-72; Canny, supra note 13, at 575, 597; E.P.
Cheyney, Some English Conditions Surrounding the Settlement of Virginia, 12 AM.
HIST. REV. 507, 514-22 (1907).
17. The Spanish had established a presence in North America as early as the
second decade of the sixteenth century. WESLEY F. CRAVEN, THE SOUTHERN COLONIES
IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY, 1607-1689, at 4 (1970). As early as 1514, Ponce de
Leon was granted a patent for Florida, where he died in 1521, trying to establish a
settlement. Id. at 4. Additionally, Francisco de Garay was granted a patent to the
1995] 333
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French 8 experiences in America. They could also draw upon
their own failed attempts to establish colonies in North Ameri-
ca, notably at Roanoke Island in the 1580's."9 They could fur-
northern shores of the Gulf of Mexico. Id. In 1526, Lucas Vdsquez de Ayllon tried to
colonize the Carolina coast. Id. In 1528 Panfilo de Narvaez received the patents once
granted to de Leon and Garay. Id. at 5. In 1540, De Soto was in the Carolinas. Id.
at 6. In that same decade the Spanish explored Texas and New Mexico. Id. at 6-8.
Between 1559 and 1561 the Spanish attempted settlements on the Alabama River
and around Santa Elena on the Carolina coast. Id. at 7-8. By the 1560's, they had
established a series of posts in Florida, leading to the spread of Jesuit missionaries
in the south. Id. at 16-17. In fact, by 1572, the Jesuits had apparently been to the
Rappahannock River in Virginia. Id. at 17. By the late sixteenth century, the Spanish
had withdrawn to Florida, where they established a flourishing colony. Id.
Craven is a useful source for citations to the Spanish and French texts which
were available to English readers in the sixteenth century.
Alexander Brown believed that the first charter "apparently concedes to Spain
all the mainland south of 34 [degrees], and to France all north of 45 [degrees] north
latitude." GENESIS, supra note 1, at 56 n.1.
18. The French briefly established a settlement at Port Royal in present-day
South Carolina in 1562, and another, under Laudonniere, at Fort Caroline, Florida, in
1564. CRAVEN, supra note 17, at 9.
The proponents of the Virginia colony closely studied Laudonniere's account. Id.
at 9. In 1587 Richard Hakluyt published a translation of Laudonniere's account. A
NOTABLE HISTORY CONTAINING FOUR VOYAGES MADE BY CERTAIN FRENCH CAPTAINS
UNTO FLORIDA (Richard H. Hakluyt & T. Dawson trans., 1587). Laudonniere's account
reappeared in RICHARD HAKLUYT, VIII THE PRINCIPAL NAVIGATIONS VOYAGES
TRAFFIQUES & DISCOVERIES OF THE ENGLISH NATION 439-86 (1965) and in Volume IX
of the same book at pages 1-100. Volume IX was also published in 1965.
19. For the primary documents relating to the colony at Roanoke Island in
present-day North Carolina, see generally 1 ROANOKE VOYAGES, supra note 11. The
colony-the famous Lost Colony-was abandoned when all the original settlers disap-
peared.
Two other attempts to colonize North America had also failed. First, Sir
Humphrey Gilbert had attempted unsuccessfully to colonize eastern North America,
especially Newfoundland between 1578 and 1584. See! generally THE HAKLUYT SOCI-
ETY, NO. 2, THE VOYAGES AND COLONISING ENTERPRISES OF SIR HUMPHREY GILBERT
181-236 (David B. Quinn ed., 1940). Gilbert had also taken part in the efforts to colo-
nize Ireland between 1566 and 1567. FOSTER, supra note 11, at 33. Second, Captains
Bartholomew Gosnold & Bartholomew Gilbert had attempted to plant in New Eng-
land in 1602. See generally WARNER F. GOORIN & PHILIP L. BARBOUR, BARTHOLOMEW
GOSNOLD: DISCOVER AND PLANTER (1963). Gosnold was later named vice admiral of
the first fleet to Virginia and became a member of the first council in Virginia. 1
JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 13.
Despite these failures to establish an English colony in America, the 1606
charter granted a license to plant in "parts and territories in America either apper-
taining unto us or which are not now actually possessed by any Christian prince or
people." Id. at 24. The meaning of "appertaining" is puzzling. It could not have meant
mere discovery as the king required actual possession by other European powers
before he would concede those powers a right. By actual possession, the English
meant, as Raleigh's 1584 patent had described it, "to have, hold, occupy and enjoy." 1
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ther draw upon the trading experience of such English compa-
nies as the Levant Company and the fledgling East India Com-
pany. The ability to draw on these experiences was possible
because some of the same men were prominent in all of these
ventures. ° Nevertheless, despite all the knowledge gleaned
from other sources, Virginia ultimately remained unknown to
the English. Many colonizers expected to confront barbarity and
savagery there.2 ' They assumed an unstructured, chaotic
world. The colonists could only presuppose and hope that exist-
ing English institutions and concepts would suffice to impose
order.
These uncertain circumstances necessarily compelled the
drafters of the enabling documents to project a particular vi-
sion, a specific story, of order in Virginia. That story declared
what life should be in the colony, filtered by representations of
how others in putatively similar circumstances had lived. Addi-
tionally, the story strongly reflected the English world from
which the story originated. Merely by reflecting that world, the
resulting instruments played a crucial role in colonizing Virgin-
ia. They implied the known in the unknown, the familiar in the
strange, England in America. For all involved, the documents
sought to imply in content, form, and language, the psychologi-
THE ROANOKE VOYAGES, supra note 11, at 82. Perhaps in using "appertaining," the
drafters were alluding to the possibility that the lost colony of Roanoke had some-
where established itself and was waiting to be found.
For the more liberal Spanish concept of legal possession, see the discussion in
STEPHEN GREENBLATT, MARVELOUS POSSESSIONS: THE WONDER OF THE NEW WORLD
167 n.7 (1991) (citing an unpublished paper by Patricia Seed).
20. For instance, the first governor of the East India Company, and also a gov-
ernor of both the Levant and Muscovy Companies, Sir Thomas Smith, was a member
of the first royal council for Virginia in London and was later treasurer of the Vir-
ginia Company. BRENNER, supra note 9, at 21, 96. Smith was at one time Lord May-
or of London. Id. at 98.
Two members of the first King's council were also associated with the East
India Company. Sir William Rumney was a governor, and John Eldred was a mem-
ber of its first court of directors. Rumney [Romney] was one of the original promoters
of the East India Company, one of its incorporators, and one of its first directors. He
was elected a governor in 1606. He was also a governor of the Merchant Adventurers'
Company, a ward alderman and a sheriff of the City of London. See XVII DICTIONARY
OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 200-01 (1967-1968) (discussing Romney); VI DICTIONARY OF
NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 592-93 (1967-1968) (discussing Eldred).
21. See generally ROY H. PEARCE, THE SAVAGES OF AMERICA: A STUDY OF THE
INDIAN AND THE IDEA OF CIVILIZATION (1965).
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cally reassuring prospect of an ordered world where most Eng-
lish believed one did not exist.
The legal and imaginative elements of the documents rein-
forced each other as early as the preamble to the first char-
ter.2' The Preamble formally demarcates "that part of America
commonly called Virginia," to which the charter lays claim.' It
is situated "all along the sea coasts between four and thirty
degrees of northerly latitude from the equinoctial line and five
and forty degrees of the same latitude and in the main land
between the same four and thirty and five and forty degrees
and the islands thereunto adjacent or within one hundred miles
of the coast thereof. .*. .25 Having formally described the
claim, the charter did not need to refer to the area by name.25
Moreover, only the English called the area Virginia, and wheth-
er they "commonly" did so is debatable.2 ' Nevertheless, naming
the area Virginia after Elizabeth I, the virgin Queen of Eng-
land, implied a perfect correspondence between England and
Virginia to which proponents of colonization aspired." Further-
22. See id.
23. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 24.
24. Id.
25. Id. The charter restricts the first colony to a portion of that area. The settlers
"may begin their said first plantation and seat of their first abode and habitation at
any place upon the said coast of Virginia or America where they shall think fit and
convenient between the said four and thirty and one and forty degrees of the said
latitude." Id. at 25-26. From the point of "first abode," it then further restricted the
colony to fifty miles "west and southwest" along the coast, fifty miles "east and north-
east" along the coast, and one hundred miles inland. Id.
26. As a name delineating a place, the name had little evidentiary value. Even if
English people commonly called an area in North America, 'Virginia," they did so
without knowing its boundaries. "Virginia" primarily expressed a desire.
27. The "Letters Patent" to Walter Raleigh in 1584 do not mention "Virginia." 1
THE ROANOKE VOYAGES, supra note 11, at 82-89. Arthur Barlowe in his "Discourse of
the First Voyage" writes that in 1584 the "discovered part of the country [is] now
called Virginia." Id. at 92. Elsewhere Raleigh notes that it is called "Wingandacon."
Id. at 116-17.
Among the names later promoters called Virginia were Nova Britannia and
Virginia Britannia. See ROBERT JOHNSON, NOVA BRITANNIA: OFFERING MOST EXCEL-
LENT FRUITS BY PLANTING IN VIRGINIA. EXCITING ALL SUCH AS BE WELL AFFECTED TO
FURTHER THE SAME. (London, 1609); WILLIAM STRACHEY, THE HISTORY OF TRAVAILE
INTO VIRGINIA BRITANNIA (Louis B. Wright & Virginia Freund eds., 1953).
28. For insight into how naming a place creates a history of a place and its peo-
ple and how renaming erases a history, see BRIAN FRIEL, TRANSLATIONS: A PLAY
(Samuel French, Inc. 1981).
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more, "commonly" had a reassuring air that suggested to poten-
tial settlers that such correspondence already existed.
The charter constantly reinforced the correspondence between
England and Virginia. Like other English charters of the peri-
od, it listed in generic terms the resources to which the paten-
tees are entitled upon successful occupation, including: "all the
lands, woods, soil, grounds, havens, ports, rivers, mines, miner-
als, marshes, waters, fishings, commodities and hereditaments
whatsoever . .. ,29 In form this list is a familiar product of the
legal mind. It defined the charter's scope, and it aimed to be
all-inclusive within that scope. Furthermore, it anticipated is-
sues while reassuring investors that it protected their source of
income. However, those compiling the list did not know whether
such resources and objects existed. An encompassing term, like
the acquisitive "whatsoever" that ends the list, would have
protected the patentees' claims. But in detailing familiar objects
at length, the list implied a reassuring similarity between Vir-
ginia and England. In short, the list told the potential colonists
what they wanted to hear.
Likewise, the language of the list reassuringly insinuated the
possibility of order. Its formal tone implying order, control and
reflection is typical of legal instruments. The entire passage,
like the documents generally, was notably devoid of the clap-
trap, emotion, and exaggeration that characterized the promo-
tional material for the colony."° Directed in part to committed
colonists, the language of the documents sought to temper any
heightened expectations that the promotional material might
have generated in advertising for prospective colonists.
Particularly for the settlers, the initiating documents were a
comforting mark of civility. For men who might have had to
stay in Virginia without their families, indefinitely if not per-
manently, the documents were almost as essential a part of
their baggage as were their provisions and armaments. To the
29. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 26.
30. See Samuel Purchas, Description of Virginia, 1613, in THE OLD DOMINION IN
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF VIRGINIA, 1606-1689, at
303-04 (Warren M. Billings ed., 1975) (providing a typical example of promotional
material).
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collective psyche, the documents served a role akin to the role
played by the religious exhortations and invocations that pre-
ceded the voyages. They were as reassuring as was the pres-
ence of a preacher on the first fleet. They were essential pre-
cisely because they implied order where the English believed it
did not exist. The presence of the documents alone offered a
psychologically reassuring connection to England.
B. Proponents of Colonization
One way to examine the forces in England shaping the plan
of government and of property relations that the initiating
documents provided for Virginia is to focus on the proponents of
colonization and the drafters of the documents. Discussion of
the proponents has concentrated on the role of the merchant
and emerging capitalist classes, particularly in London, but also
in Bristol, Plymouth, and other western ports. 1 Economic mo-
tives largely explained their interest in America.2 Many mer-
chants were seeking reliable sources of imports.3 Some were
seeking the elusive northwest passage to India to gain easier
access to Asia's exotic products.34 Virginia was a place where a
search for the route could be organized. 5 Others were seeking
new markets for English exports, particularly wool and cloth. 6
31. See ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 27-52; CRAVEN, supra note 17, at 60.
32. Almost any text that discusses the early history of this country will list the
economic factors that motivated colonization. I have especially relied upon BRENNER,
supra note 9, at 92-112 (challenging accepted generalizations about the economic
forces behind colonization) and CRAVEN, supra note 17, at 27-59.
33. Merchants were growing weary of the "periodical physical disruption of their
traditional trade routes--especially those to the Antwerp and Iberian entrepdts. These
disruptions compelled certain merchants interested in imports to seek better access to
the ultimate sources of supply." BRENNER, supra note 9, at 5.
34. For brief discussions of how the search for this mythical passage shaped Eng-
lish contact with America, see ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 20-21 & n.1 and CRAVEN,
supra note 17, at 31-33.
35. The London Council's "Instructions given by way of advice" to the planters
provided that "Ly]ou must observe if you can whether the river on which you plant
doth spring out of mountains or out of lakes; if it be out of any lake the passage to
the other sea will be the more easy & it is like enough that out of that same lake
you shall find some spring which run the contrary way toward the East India Sea." 1
JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 49-51.
36. According to Brenner, by the early seventeenth century the "north European
cloth markets were not expanding, and were plagued by certain chronic difficulties."
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Some hoped to acquire land in order to develop its resources.
Others believed that, as in South America, gold, silver and
copper would be discovered.
However, economic motives alone did not motivate all of
those involved in the North American venture. Perhaps influ-
enced by propagandists such as Richard Hakluyt,37 some mer-
chants undoubtedly responded to patriotic appeals.38 In estab-
lishing an American colony, those who had an imperialist view
wanted a base in the southern part of North America from
which to challenge Spanish power in the region.
In the drive to colonize Virginia, merchants and capitalists
were undoubtedly important figures. But men trained and ac-
tive in the law were, arguably, just as important in successfully
initiating, planning and promoting the Virginia enterprise of
1606. Moreover, they certainly influenced this venture more
than they had any previous English effort in North America.
1. Legal Proponents
Men with rich experience in the law were involved in all
initial phases of the venture. They were among those who insti-
gated the effort, joined the petitioners and patentees, drafted
the initiating documents, sat on the King's Council in London,
gave advice to the chief proponents, invested in the venture,
and were appointed to the first Council in Virginia. The perva-
sive influence of men with legal knowledge and experience
contributed to the original character of the colony's government
and the structure of property relations.
Many of the legal figures were also experienced in trade, in
plantation schemes, and even in privateering. 9 So the econom-
ic impulses that motivated the merchants and investors also
influenced the legal group's advocating an American colony.
BRENNER, supra note 9, at 23.
37. See generally RICHARD HAKLUYT, DISCOURSE OF WESTERN PLANTING (David B.
Quinn & Alison M. Quinn eds., 1993).
38. Sir Thomas Smith appears to have been one such merchant. See BRENNER,
supra note 9, at 92-112.
39. See infra text accompanying note 137.
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Economic trends and occupational experiences inevitably tem-
pered the degree to which they approached their roles as draft-
ers of the documents and proponents of colonization. But at
least in the initial planning stage their legal education and
experience undoubtedly influenced their view of how to govern.
Those who played pivotal roles in devising a scheme of gov-
ernment included the most powerful men in the English legal
system. Key players included the Lord Chief Justice, the So-
licitor General, the Attorney General and, perhaps, the King's
counsel. So situated, these men influenced the drafting of both
the petition for a license to plant in Virginia and the accompa-
nying charter.4 ° They also contributed to revisions and oversaw
the charter's passage to enactment. They were well situated to
undermine opposing schemes to colonize Virginia.41
Of these influential legal men, the most active in the Virgin-
ia enterprise was the Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench,
Sir John Popham. Popham had previous experience with planta-
tions.42 In the mid-1580's he had invested heavily in transport-
ing laborers to land assigned him in the Irish plantations. But
Popham encountered difficulties and soon abandoned his direct
involvement in the Irish plantations. Popham did, however,
observe the plantation process when he was appointed to exam-
ine claims to escheated lands in Munster during the plantation
period.4"
His Irish experience seems not to have tainted Popham's
view of plantations, and events in 1605 restimulated his inter-
est. George Waymouth had returned from an exploratory voyage
to "Virginia" with five Native Americans. Waymouth then
agreed to help Sir John Zouche establish a settlement in Vir-
ginia." The publicity surrounding Waymouth's return and
40. The petitioners typically included a draft with their petition. But, lacking
extant evidence, we do not know whether a draft actually accompanied the petition of
1606. For descriptions of the process and for further speculation on this matter, see
ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 81-82, 85; 1 GENESIS, supra note 1, at vi-vii; 1 JAMES-
TOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 14.
41. See generally infra text accompanying notes 201-14 (discussing the 'jockeying"
that occurred in determining the type of system that would be enacted).
42. XVI DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 148 (1967-1968).
43. Popham spent about 12 months in Ireland from 1588 to 1589. Id.
44. The agreement appears in 1 GENESIS, supra note 1, at 32-35.
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Zouche's scheme aroused Popham's commercial instincts. To
forestall Zouche's effort, Popham had to act promptly. Neverthe-
less, Popham's motives were not purely commercial. Popham
opposed Zouche's scheme because he disliked Edward, Lord
Zouche, who had married Popham's daughter.45 So in 1605,
Popham played an instigatory role in "interesting]" many of
the lords and others to be petitioners to his Majesty for his
royal authority, for setting two Plantations upon the coasts of
America, by the names of the First and Second Colony."46
Popham's influence extended beyond encouraging petitioners.
Among those he interested in petitioning the Crown were two
relatives including his nephew, the ex-privateer George Popham
and his grandson, a lawyer named Thomas Hannam.47 Both
men were subsequently included among the eight men whom
the charter specifically named patentees.48
Popham involved two other relatives in the enterprise, his
only son, Sir Francis Popham, and another grandson, Thomas
Warre. These men were among those whom the King appointed
45. 1 ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 80.
46. Sir Ferdinando Gorges, A Brief Narration of the Original Undertakings of the
Advancement of Plantations into the Parts of America, in 1 GENESIS, supra note 1, at
50.
Barbour writes that Popham "took some sort of 'great pains' about the planta-
tion of a colony in Virginia, and declared himself ready to call all interested parties
before him and 'by their advices set down the best manner of project.'" 1 JAMESTOWN
VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 14 (footnote omitted).
47. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 16.
48. The charter stated that "diverse others of our loving subjects" were also peti-
tioners. Id. at 24.
Four petitioners, later patentees, associated with the City of London, sought a
license to plant the "first" or more southern colony. Id. at 15-16. The Jamestown
colony resulted from their efforts. These four patentees were Sir Thomas Gates (later
a governor of Virginia), Sir George Somers (a member of Parliament and a former
privateer), Richard Hakluyt (author of THE PRINCIPAL NAVIGATIONS: VOYAGES
TRAFFIQUES & DISCOVERIES OF THE ENGLISH NATION), and Edward M. Wingfield (first
president of the colony and former soldier in the Netherlands). Id.
The other four patentees, associated with the ports of Plymouth and Bristol,
sought a license for the "second," and more northern colony. Id. at 24. These paten-
tees included Raleigh Gilbert, son of Sir Humphrey Gilbert and nephew of Sir Walter
Raleigh, Thomas Hannam, William Parker, and George Popham. Id. at 16. Most stud-
ies of the Jamestown colony do not examine the influence of these men on that colo-
ny and of those associated with them who were promoting a more northern colony.
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in late 1606 to the first "King's Council of Virginia."49 That
council was to be responsible for "the superior managing and
direction . . . of and for all matters that shall or may concern
the government" of the colony.5" Francis Popham had received
some legal education at the Middle Temple and was a member
of Parliament.5 Thomas Warre was a councilor at law.
52
In addition to promoting the venture, Sir John Popham prob-
ably drafted the version of the first charter, the letters patent,
that almost certainly accompanied the petition for a license to
plant." He also probably helped draft any revisions. The Solic-
itor General, John Dodderidge, and the Attorney General, Sir
Edward Coke, may have aided Popham in drafting the char-
ter." Dodderidge was appointed later in 1606 to the King's
Council of Virginia.55 The Lord Chancellor, Lord Ellesmere
(Thomas Egerton), who affixed the great seal on the charter,
may also have played a role in drafting it.56 Circumstantial
49. Id. at 35.
50. Id. at 28.
51. XVI DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 143 (1967-1968).
52. CONWAY W. SAMS, THE CONQUEST OF VIRGINIA: THE SECOND ATrEMPT 44
(photo. reprint 1973) (1929).
53. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 14. Andrews writes that Popham
was "doubtless, the chief author" of the patent. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 89. Alex-
ander Brown also speculates that Popham drew up the first draft of the proposed
charter annexed to the petition. 1 GENESIS, supra note 1, at vi.
54. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 14. Brown states that before the
perfected charter was signed and sealed, the first draft had to pass for inspection,
revision, and legal drawing through "the hands of the King, the Privy Council, the
Secretary of State, the Attorney-general, the Solicitor-general, the Lord Chancellor,
etc." Brown adds that Coke and Dodderidge "prepared," the "charter itself." 1 GENE-
SIS, supra note 1, at vi-vii. Andrews asserts that Coke and Dodderidge "undoubtedly
scrutinized" the text of the charter. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 85.
55. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 35. The charter required that the
Council of Virginia be established for "the superior managing and direction...
of. . . all matters that shall or may concern the government" of the colonies. Id. at
28; see also 1 SUSAN KINGSBURY, THE RECORDS OF THE VIRGINIA COMPANY OF LON-
DON 11 (1906).
Although the charter specified that the council have thirteen members, fourteen
were initially appointed. Barbour suggests that the fourteen were equally divided
between the London and West Country groups. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1,
at 20. For the names of those appointed to the Council, see id. at 35.
Fulfilling its responsibility, the Council issued "Certain Orders and Directions"
late in 1606 to those traveling on the first fleet to Virginia. Id. at 45-48. It also
issued "Instructions given by way of advice." Id. at 49-54.
56. Andrews implies that Egerton played this role. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 85.
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evidence suggests that the king's counsel, Sir Francis Bacon,
may have also exerted some influence over the drafting of the
charter.57 He subscribed to the Virginia Company stock in
1609,8 and became the second treasurer of the Company.59
He may also have "prepared" both the second and third char-
ters for Virginia.6"
Among both the patentees and the members of the King's
Council of Virginia, experience in legal matters was not lacking.
Of the eight named patentees, two had legal experience other
than Thomas Hannam, Popham's grandson. Sir Thomas Gates
attended Gray's Inn in 159861 and Sir George Somers had
been elected a member of Parliament in 1604.2 Of the mem-
bers of the King's Council, at least two other members, besides
Dodderidge and Popham's son, also had legal educations. These
members were the recorder of the City of London,6 3 Henry
Mountague and the Lieutenant of the Tower of London, Sir
William Wade. Another member of the Council, Sir William
Rumney, had been an alderman and a sheriff of the City of
London.'
Egerton appears to have been interested in the colony from the start as im-
plied in a letter from the Spanish ambassador to London, Don Pedro de Zuniga, to
his King in 1609. According to Zuniga, Egerton had allegedly stated that "[w]e always
thought at first we should send people there little by little, and now we see that the
proper thing is to fortify ourselves all at once." 1 GENESIS, supra note 1, at 259; see
also 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 260.
57. See generally BAKER, supra note 15, at 142 (describing the powers of the
king's counsel). The king's counsel was not an office that would necessarily have
involved Bacon in matters involving the charters. Id.
58. 1 GENESIS, supra note 1, at 209-29. Charles Andrews declared Bacon to be
"influential in securing the patent for the London and Bristol Company for the plant-
ing of Newfoundland in 1610." ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 72. Bacon was also actively
interested in the Irish plantations, submitting plans for the settlement of the country.
Cheyney, supra note 16, at 517.
59. SAMIS, supra note 52, at 48.
60. 1 GENESIS, supra note 1, at vii. For Bacon's mature views on plantations, see
the essay "On Plantations" that he published in 1625. FRANCIS BACON, On Planta-
tions, in BACON'S ESSAYS AND COLOURS OF GOOD AND EVIL 139-43 (W. Aldis Wright
ed., London, MacMillian 1872).
61. SAM S, supra note 52, at 19.
62. Id. at 21. Somers remained in Parliament during the time the charter was
drafted. He had also been a privateer.
63. The recorder was the chief advisor and advocate of the City Corporation. The
Court of Aldermen of the City elected the recorder for life. See THE OXFORD COMPAN-
ION TO LAW 1044 (David M. Walker ed., 1980).
64. As an alderman, Rumney belonged to an "oligarchic body" largely composed of
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At least nine of the fourteen Council members were members
of Parliament, and a tenth Council member was a former mem-
ber of Parliament." A majority of the Council had, therefore,
had some experience in law-making.66 The task of law-making
probably attracted the more thoughtful and ambitious of them
in envisioning the sort of society they desired for England.
Moreover, members of Parliament typically came from the same
class as justices of the peace. So even if council members had
not been justices of the peace, they would have had frequent
contact with such men. These men possessed "first hand knowl-
edge of the problems of local government, and of the sort of
measures which were best fitted to solve them."6 7
In summary, among those involved in all initial phases of the
Virginia venture of 1606 were men who were accustomed to
contemplating the structure of society from the perspective of
its legal institutions. Many of these same men were experienced
in making and interpreting laws. Others were experts in
pragmatic matters of local government. These rich resources,
which earlier ventures to America had merely tapped, were
mined in 1606.
II. GOVERNING THE VIRGINIA ENTERPRISE
The charter mandated a novel and short-lived bifurcated
governmental structure. The charter provided that two councils,
top company traders "that essentially governed the City." BRENNER, supra note 9, at
89.
65. Barbour states that ten men on the Council were members of Parliament at
the time of the charter, and that an eleventh was a prior member. 1 JAMESTOWN
VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 20. Conway W. Sams names nine as members: Sir Walter
Cope, Sir George Moor, Sir Francis Popham, Sir John Trevor, Sir Henry Montague,
John Dodderidge, Thomas James, James Bagge and Sir William Wade. SAMS, supra
note 52, at 43.
66. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 20.
67. W.S. Holdsworth, The Elizabethan Age in English Legal History and its Re-
sults, 12 IOWA L. REV. 321, 324 (1927); see J.H. GLEASON, THE JUSTICES OF THE
PEACE IN ENGLAND: 1558 TO 1640 A LATER ETEENARCHA (1979) (a comprehensive
work on the role of justices of the peace in England during the early 1600's); DAVID
T. KONIG, LAW AND SOCIETY IN PURITAN MASSACHUSETTS, ESSEX COUNTY, 1629-1692,
at 13-16 (1979) (briefly summarizing the role of justices of the peace in early seven-
teenth century England).
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one in London, the other in Virginia, would jointly govern the
colony. A kings council in London was to be responsible for
"the superior managing and direction only of and for all mat-
ters that shall or may concern the government" of the colony.8
For this royal council, the charter mandated thirteen members
whom the King was to appoint and whom he could replace at
will.69 A council residing in the colony was to "govern and or-
der all matters and causes which shall arise grow or happen to
or within" the colony "according to such laws, ordinances, and
instructions as shall be in that behalf given and signed with
[the King's] hand.""
A. The Royal Council in London
Because King James I could appoint to the council in London
those who represented his interests, ultimate authority in colo-
nial affairs resided with him. Therefore, he could immediately
affect the activities of those organizing the venture. Perhaps for
that reason many merchants among the proponents and the
West Country petitioners initially opposed the royal council
provision.7 However, merchants and petitioners needed royal
consent to transport goods and people out of England and to
import the colony's products into England. Ultimately, they
agreed to accept the idea of a royal council.
Lawyers among the proponents of colonization, particularly
Popham, Coke, Dodderidge and, perhaps, Bacon, were probably
instrumental not only in providing a royal council, but also in
providing one in an institutional context acceptable to all in-
volved.72 Popham, for instance, may have supported the council
as an alternative to private exploitation of North America 73
because he favored public companies. 4 By spreading cost and
68. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 28. Responsibility for the idea of the
council "is far from clear." ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 84-85.
69. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 28, 35-36.
70. Id. at 27.
71. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 84-85; 1 JAMESTOVN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at
18. No such council had appeared in the earlier grant to Walter Raleigh. 1 THE
ROANOKE VOYAGES, supra note 11, at 82-89.
72. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 85-86.
73. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 14.
74. See 1 GENESIS, supra note 1, at 37-42 (referring to a paper titled, Reasons or
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risk among all investors, public companies increased the
likelihood of a venture's success.75 Such companies were less
susceptible to "delays, jealousies and unwillingness to back that
project which succeeded not at the first attempt."7 Moreover,
as public companies brought greater diversity of skill and in-
dustry to an enterprise, they could better adapt to circumstanc-
es and capitalize on initial gains.77 Popham also knew that if a
private venture succeeded it would provoke "the jealousy of
[the] state."78 The state would, therefore, most likely intervene
when a private venture was "at the greatest height of for-
tune."79 For these reasons, Popham opposed private undertak-
ings and supported public companies." The political climate at
that time, however, was not fully conducive to public compa-
nies. Consequently Popham had to advance some other form of
non-private involvement.81
Popham's advocating public companies indicates that he also
accepted some Crown involvement in colonization. Merely in
acquiring their public status, such public companies inevitably
conceded the Crown a role.82 Moreover, the companies de-
pended upon the king for the continued protected status of
their privileges. 3 Consequently, the king could control these
companies. But these reasons do not adequately explain why
Popham and the other lawyers accepted the potentially far
more intrusive royal council. Those like Coke who might other-
Motives for the Raising of a Public Stock to be Employed for the Peopling and Discov-
ering of Such Countries). Brown believes that Popham wrote this paper and that it
appeared before the granting of the charter. Id. at 42 n.1. This document may have
been a plea to parliament to raise a public stock. Id. at 36. However, Brown believes
that "it was written in the interest of a public company or companies, and against
private enterprises." Id. at 42 n.1.
75. 1 GENESIS, supra note 1, at 37.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 40.
78. Id. at 38.
79. Id.
80. As I have already indicated, Popham's opposition to private undertakings may
also have stemmed from personal motives. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
Popham had other reasons for advocating public participation. 1 GENESIS, supra note
1, at 37-42; see supra note 74.
81. For a discussion of this climate, see infra text accompanying notes 175-93.
82. See 1 GENESIS, supra note 1, at 42 n.1.
83. Because of this dependence, Crown-sanctioned commercial corporations tended
to support royal government. BRENNER, supra note 9, at 83.
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wise have opposed the royal council may have accepted it be-
cause the charter provided for popular control in Virginia and
provided that settlers would enjoy the same "liberties, franchis-
es, and immunities" in the colony as they would in England.'
Perhaps others accepted it because, as Popham's "Reasons"
hints,"5 they feared a breakaway colony. If a breakaway colony
materialized, investors would be denied a financial return, and
England would be without a source to furnish imports on favor-
able terms. A breakaway colony may have seemed less likely
under a royal council than under a public company. Providing
the former implied that King James might assist and protect
the venture. Assistance and protection were important consider-
ations because other European powers were also interested in
Virginia. Providing a royal council also counterbalanced the
grant to the council in Virginia of broad powers pregnant with
subversive possibilities. A popular council provision for Virginia
raised the possibility of an independent "popular state."6 Roy-
al supervision undercut that possibility in a way that company
supervision might not have. Under company supervision, pri-
vate commercial concerns could dominate company supervision
of the colony. Ultimately, perhaps, all accepted the institutional
scheme provided in the charter because it resembled that gov-
erning affairs in England. This resemblance gave the scheme a
familiar, reassuring air.
Although ultimate authority for the Virginia venture resided
with King James I, he, in fact, left overall control and direction
to those most interested in the venture. Proponents of the
scheme and their associates dominated those whom he appoint-
ed to the council." Merchants, for instance, were well repre-
sented as they numbered five of the fourteen council mem-
bers.' The full burden of financing and advertising the adven-
84. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 31. Coke, for instance, with his
common law predisposition and his House of Comnmon's leanings would have protected
the privileges of the colonists.
85. 1 GENESIS, supra note 1, 8, at 38, % 11, at 39.
86. The fear of a popular state existed at the time. See 1 GENESIS, supra note 1,
at 37-42; see also supra note 74.
87. For those appointed, see 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 35.
88. Id. at 20. The merchants were Sir Thomas Smith, Sir William Romney, John
Eldred, James Bagge and Thomas James. Smith, Romney and Eldred were associated
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ture, acquiring and outfitting ships, bringing people to the colo-
ny, and supplying the colonists' provisions fell on the propo-
nents of the plan.89
Such a passive stance with respect to colonizing America was
not unusual for English monarchs. ° Queen Elizabeth I, for
instance, had granted several patents, but she had taken no
further role primarily because her finances were limited.91 For
the same reason King James I did not intervene. He had nei-
ther the desire to organize nor the resources to finance or con-
trol colonization. Furthermore, he could not underwrite invest-
ment in overseas trade because his treasury was depleted.
However, because of his depleted resources King James I en-
couraged the proposal to colonize Virginia. Having limited au-
thority to tax land in England, he relied, as the monarchy tra-
ditionally had, upon commerce, particularly upon customs du-
ties and imposts, as a source of income.9"
King James' stance, and particularly his appointments to the
royal council, must have reassured risk-averse potential inves-
tors. As proponents of colonization knew, attracting investors
with the East India Company. Id. Since the protected status of the East India Com-
pany trade depended upon the charter that the Crown granted these merchants, King
James probably assumed that he could trust these merchants.
89. Particularly in settling the colony, the proponents lacked experience. They did
not begin to attract settlers until they formally incorporated a joint-stock company in
1609. In the middle of the next decade when the Company finally permitted some
immediate private use of land, Virginia began to attract a far greater number of
settlers. Edward P. Cheyney estimated that the following numbers "left England for
Virginia: 1606-1609, 300; 1609-1618, 1,500; 1618-1621, 3,570." Cheney, supra note 16,
at 522-23.
90. CRAVEN, supra note 17, at 42-43. Extremely limited state participation con-
tinued to characterize the English colonial effort in America. Without the state to
organize, proponents and entrepreneurs had to seek alternative instruments. English
reliance on private instruments was not unusual. At the start of the seventeenth
century, only the Spanish national government had the resources to develop overseas
trade and colonization. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 43 n.1. "The French, Dutch, Dan-
ish, and English East India companies were all private affairs. . . ." Id.
91. For figures on the Crown debt and a discussion of how that debt affected
trading expeditions in the mid-sixteenth century, see SCOTT, supra note 11, at 23-33.
92. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 43 n.1. For a discussion of the state of Crown
finances for the five years following the accession of King James I, see SCOTT, supra
note 11, at 133-37.
93. BRENNER, supra note 9, at 46. For a further discussion of taxation from 1587
to 1603, see SCOTT, supra note 11, at 93-97.
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was likely to be a considerable problem. Far more lucrative
opportunities were open to merchants.94 Colonization necessi-
tated that the merchants wait longer for profitable returns than
if they had invested in simple commercial ventures. The London
merchant community, the best source of capital for invest-
ment,95 had traditionally been averse to colonizing because it
was a high-risk, fixed-capital investment. 6 The most powerful
merchants preferred to "[operate] under restricted, corporately
controlled conditions designed to regulate competition, to mini-
mize risk, and to ensure profits."97 In fact, few merchants had
participated in the 1570's and 1580's when Gilbert and Raleigh
had tried to colonize." Instead, the landed class led and fi-
nanced both of these ventures.9
We can deduce the general attitude of London investors to-
ward colonization at this time by looking at the experience of
the East India Company. Until 1606, East India Company in-
vestors constantly resisted advancing funds for a new venture
until they had recovered on a previous one."0 The merchants
who backed the company did not permit it to become involved
in any colonizing or plantation ventures, even though this re-
fusal endangered their privileges.'' The East India Company
preferred to operate in the highly profitable conditions of their
established trades and avoid the risks that developing new
trades generated.0 2
In an effort to attract reluctant and cautious investors, the
charter informed investors that the Crown had granted a virtu-
al monopoly on trade to the patentees and their associates."3
94. Many in England believed Ireland offered better opportunity. ANDREWS, supra
note 4, at 72.
95. BRENNER, supra note 9, at 96.
96. Id. at 106.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 108-09.
99. Id. at 108.
100. Id. at 96.
101. Id. at 106.
102. Id.
103. The charter did not grant a pure monopoly on trade in Virginia. Instead, the
treasurer of the colony was allowed to impose a levy of 2.50% on English traders and
5.00% on foreign traders plying there without permission of the patentees and their
associates. 1 JAMIESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 30. The Crown gave the company
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The appointments to the royal council could then assure inves-
tors that men with values similar to their own would dominate
the royal council." 4
B. The Council in Virginia
To the Virginia Council, the charter of 1606 allocated a rare
degree of self-governance. To the settlers, it offered the novel
prospect of participation in government. The Council was per-
mitted to remove and elect its thirteen members,0 5 even
though the royal council in London originally chose its initial
members.' A majority of the councilors in Virginia could,
"upon any just cause," remove a councilor from office and elect
another in his place.' 7
The allocation to a local council of the power to remove and
elect its members was unusual in English colonial affairs. Nei-
ther preceding nor subsequent patents offered colonists control
of their own affairs on such generous terms. Earlier patents,
such as Walter Raleigh's of 1584, had granted proprietary
rights to one individual.0 8 Raleigh had "full and mere power
and authority to correct, punish, pardon, govern and rule
by ... good discretions and policies as well in causes capital or
criminal as civil."09 He was empowered to devise "statutes,
laws and ordinances" provided that these "may be as near as
conveniently they may be agreeable to the forms of the laws,
statutes, government or policy of England." ° Later patents
gave local control to governors, who were essentially military
figures with corresponding powers. For instance, the second
a seven-year break on customs subsidies and duties on items imported into the colony
from England, Ireland and all its other dominions. Id. at 31. In return, it required
one-fifth of the gold and silver and one-fifteenth of the copper found in the colony. Id.
at 28.
104. Id. at 35-36.
105. Id. at 27.
106. Id. at 36.
107. Id. The Council in Virginia also had the authority to choose a president from
among its members. Id. The president had the authority to cast the deciding vote "in
all matters of controversy and question." Id. at 47.
108. See 1 THE ROANOKE VOYAGES, supra note 11, at 82-89.
109. Id. at 86.
110. Id. at 87.
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charter, granted in 1609, abolished the Council in Virginia."'
The second charter incorporated the Virginia Company,"2 ap-
pointed the initial members of the King's Council,"' and au-
thorized it to appoint a governor for the colony."4 The second
charter thereby replaced a participatory form of governance
with a far more rigid and hierarchical one.
In contrast to these charters, the 1606 charter granted colo-
nists, collectively, extremely broad freedom to manage their own
affairs."' Previously, the fate of colonists had been closely tied
to that of the individual to whom the patent had been granted.
To recognize the dangers of that precarious tie, potential set-
tlers only had to recall the fate of the lost colony established
under Raleigh's grant but left stranded in Roanoke twenty
years earlier." 6 Greater authority to manage their own affairs
consequently aimed to reduce the settlers' sense of dependence
and to promote their commitment to the venture. It aimed to
forge a sense of community. But for organizers and investors in
the venture, delegating authority in this manner increased the
risk of not recovering their investment because it rendered a
breakaway colony likely. It also increased the difficulty of en-
suring that the settlers pursued the best interests of their fi-
nancial backers in England.
To reduce the incentive for settlers to breakaway or pursue
more self-interested policies, the enabling documents declared
that settlers were to be treated under colonial law as they
would be in England. They were, for instance, granted the same
"liberties, franchises, and immunities" as they would enjoy in
England."' For example, after initially working for the com-
mon stock, the colonists could possess and inherit land as they
would in England ."8
111. GENESIS, supra note 1, at 234.
112. Id. at 229.
113. Id. at 231-32. Members of the company were to choose future members of
that council. Id. at 232-33.
114. Id. at 233.
115. See 1 JAMESTOVN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 27.
116. See 2 THE ROANOKE VOYAGES, supra note 11, at 593.
117. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 31.
118. Id. at 33.
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Seeking other means to minimize the risks to their interests,
the backers of colonization strove to create a homogeneous
group of settlers.119 Achieving homogeneity, especially initially,
in that potentially hostile environment, was an important con-
sideration in planning the venture. The first settlers had to
depend on each other to survive and would continuously be in
close contact.12° Reducing the possibility of dissension among
the settlers was essential if they were efficiently to establish a
colony. 21 Dissension is less likely in a homogeneous group
whose members subscribe to common values and aspirations.
Moreover, a homogeneous group has a better chance of develop-
ing and enforcing effective and informal means for resolving
disputes because the group would share many assumptions
about life and goals.
To forge such a homogeneous group, the enabling documents
limited the right to travel to Virginia. 2 ' The patentees had
the right to transport to Virginia as many English subjects as
were willing to go. 23 However, to prevent a breakaway colony,
119. The first settlers, all male, included a preacher, gentlemen, carpenters, brick-
layers, sailors (to remain in Virginia), laborers, boys, a drummer, a blacksmith, a
tailor, a barber, and two surgeons.
For a list of the first planters, with a contemporaneous description of their
social standing or occupation, see SAMS, supra note 52, at 821-23; JOHN SMITH, THE
GENERAL HISTORY OF VIRGINIA, NEW ENGLAND AND THE SUMMER ISLES (1624), re-
printed in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF CAPTAIN JOHN SMITH 140-42 (Phillip L.
Barbour ed., 1986); THOMAS STUDLEY, THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ENGLISH COLONY IN
VIRGINIA (1612), reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF CAPTAIN JOHN SMITH 207-
09 (Phillip L. Barbour ed., 1986).
Of the 67 names that Studley provides, he labels 29 "gentlemen." These do not
include the seven councillors who would otherwise fall under the title. Among the
gentlemen Studley includes, one, Thomas Wotton, as a surgeon. Interestingly, one of
the "labourers," William Wilkinson, is also described as a surgeon. STUDLEY, supra, at
208-09.
Craven remarks that "[w]hatever that designation [gentlemen] may have im-
plied regarding their social standing at home, it undoubtedly indicates some difference
in the kind of employment these men expected in the colony." CRAVEN, supra note
17, at 71.
120. For a brief discussion of the relationship between successful participatory
government and the homogeneity of a group of concurrent land owners, see Ellickson,
supra note 2, at 1348-60.
121. For instance, a Catholic presence in the colony might have contributed to
dissension. See infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
122. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 29.
123. Id.
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the Crown reserved and exercised the right to restrain those
who refused to take the oaths of allegiance and supremacy.'2
In reciting the oaths before leaving England, settlers ac-
knowledged and submitted to the authority of the Crown in the
colony as a condition of traveling to Virginia. The ritual aimed
to reinforce the link to England and to make breaking away
psychologically difficult.
121
As the oath of supremacy denounced the Pope's right to re-
move kings, Catholics were specifically excluded from the colo-
ny. To ensure that no Catholics would travel, all emigrating to
Virginia were required to produce "a certificate from the Minis-
ter of the Parish where they last dwelt and from two Justices
of the Peace, or the Mayor of their town, of their conversation
and conformity to the orders and discipline of the Church of
England, that is, proof that they were Protestants and not
Roman Catholics.' 26 The presence of Catholics in the colony
might prove divisive. In England, anti-Catholic sentiment was
rampant because some leading Catholics were implicated in the
Guy Fawkes affair, a plot to blow up the houses of parlia-
ment.2 1 In January 1606, Guy Fawkes was executed after be-
ing convicted of high treason before Sir John Popham.' 28 Be-
cause of their treatment in England, Catholics in the colony
might have an incentive to collaborate with the Spanish and
sever the link with England. Barring Catholics from the colony,
therefore, protected the investors' interests.
The documents further curtailed the right to "abide and in-
habit" in Virginia.' 29 Both the patentees and the "colony" had
124. Id. The "Instructions" restrained from abiding and remaining in the colony
those who refused to take "not only the usual oath of obedience to us, our heirs and
successors, but also the oath which is limited in the last session of Parliament held
at Westminster, in the fourth year of our reign, for their due obedience unto us, our
heirs and successors." Id. at 42-43.
125. See, e.g., id. at 43.
126. SAhS, supra note 52, at 83-84. The second charter again required the Oath of
Supremacy of all going to Virginia. 1 GENESIS, supra note 1, at 236-37.
The principle that no Catholics should live in Virginia was "maintained in more
or less vigor for the first century" of the colony's existence. SAMS, supra note 52, at
83.
127. SAMS, supra note 52, at 82, 109.
128. Id. at 109.
129. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 29.
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the authority to grant a license to those seeking to inhabit the
area.' Both groups could "expulse, repel and resist as well
by sea as by land by all ways and means whatsoever" those
without license to inhabit.'13  Colonists who attempted the
"hurt, detriment or annoyance" of the colony could be
expelled. 132 Those colonists who wanted to return home had to
get permission.
131
To ensure that dissension in Virginia would not distress
investors in England, the backers took further steps to bolster
the image of homogeneity. The London Council imposed upon
the council in Virginia the task of providing "a perfect rela-
tion . . . of all that is done."" The council was to "suffer no
man to . . . write any letter of any thing that may discourage
others."'35 In other words, events were to conform to expecta-
tions.
Also to protect the investors' expectations during the danger-
ous initial period, the London Council was granted the authori-
ty to appoint the first council in Virginia. The council used its
authority to select a group of seven councilors who were bound
to reassure investors. 13 ' Five councilors had military experi-
ence and had commanded men. Captain John Smith was proba-
bly chosen because of his experience in exotic places. Captains
Christopher Newport and Bartholomew Gosnold, respectively
admiral and vice-admiral of the first fleet to Virginia, had
privateering experience in the Atlantic.' Captain John
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 30.
133. Id. at 53.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 53-54.
136. The Council for Virginia was selected before the expedition set sail. Its com-
position was to be revealed "within four and twenty hours next after the said ships
shall arrive upon the said coast of Virginia and not before." Id. at 46. We do not
know why the London Council selected only seven of thirteen councillors. Presumably,
it intended that those selected would choose the remaining members upon landing in
Virginia. Given those whom the London Council did choose (particularly a named
patentee and the admiral and vice-admiral of the fleet to Virginia), anyone they
picked would clearly have been subordinate.
137. Thad W. Tate, Bibliographical Directory to PHILIP L. BARBOUR 1 THE COM-
PLETE WORKS OF CAPTAIN JOHN SMITH xxvii, xxxvi (Philip L. Barbour ed., 1986).
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Ratcliffe, of whom we know little, was master of one of the
three ships to make the voyage. The fifth member of this group,
John Martin, was closer in background to the remaining ap-
pointees and bridged the two groups. Martin was the son of Sir
Richard Martin, the Master of the Mint and Lord Mayor of
London, and the brother-in-law of Sir Julius Caesar, the Master
of the Rolls. 8' John Martin originally trained as a lawyer, but
opted instead to pursue a military career."9 The remaining
two appointees directly represented the interests of the paten-
tees. Edward Maria Wingfield was a named patentee. 4 ° He
"came from a family long noted for distinguished public ser-
vice."' The last member, George Kendall, was a relative of
the Earl of Pembroke and of Sir Edwin Sandys, an important
parliamentary leader.'42
C. The Municipal Corporation as a Model for Governing the
Colony
Did proponents of colonization favor participatory government
solely because a homogeneous group granted self-governing
powers could better respond to investors' interests? Experienced
businessmen seeking stricter control and seeking to minimize
administrative and transactional costs might have preferred a
138. Id. at xl.
139. SAMS, supra note 52, at 29.
140. 1 JAMIESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 24.
141. X DICTIONARY OF AAIERICAN BIOGRAPHY 388 (1967-1968).
142. Barbour, supra note 137, at lxvii. Being from the upper reaches of the social
hierarchy did not guarantee a place on the Council in Virginia. (For those appointed
to the Council, see ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 99). Nor did a legal education guar-
antee a place on the Council. The London Council notably omitted George Percy from
the Virginia Council. As the younger brother of the ninth Earl of Northumberland,
Percy was a member of one of the great houses of England. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES,
supra note 1, at 128. Likewise the Council did not appoint Captain Gabriel Archer
who had legal training. Id. at 3, 126.
Men such as Percy and Archer might have anticipated initial membership. But
even on landing in Virginia, Percy and Archer were not added immediately to the
Council. Those originally selected did not elect anyone to fulfill the mandated thirteen
members on the Council. 1 TRAVELS AND WORKS OF CAPTAIN JOHN SMITH 91 (Edward
Arber ed., 1910). Failure to appoint further members at that time did not seem to
generate much controversy. Later, however, failing to replace dead or removed mem-
bers caused considerable dissension. See, e.g., for instance, Edward M. Wingfield,
Discourse, in 1 JAIESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 218.
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more hierarchical operation. The public company that many of
the chief proponents advocated for managing the Virginia ven-
ture may have better addressed these economic concerns. A
public company would have most likely relied upon a represen-
tative, such as a governor, to manage its affairs in the colony.
But a public company was not incorporated in 1606. Proponents
opted instead for a more participatory structure, in part, for the
reasons discussed above. In addition, they also eschewed incor-
porating because of the political climate in England.' Despite
the political climate, the proponents, by choosing a council,
managed to acquire greater privileges than incorporated compa-
nies had traditionally acquired. As long as they could influence
the composition of the council and control access to the colony,
proponents may have believed that they were acquiring tighter
control of colonial affairs.
The legal means of achieving greater privilege and control
was to consider the "colony" as a corporate entity having the
legal status typically ascribed to an incorporated municipality, a
borough.' But this character of the colony has eluded many
historians. Typically scholars have focused on the commercial
forces propelling colonization and, more particularly, on the role
of the Virginia Company.' Consequently, historians have de-
143. See text infra accompanying notes 175-80.
144. For my discussion of incorporation, I have drawn upon the following texts:
JOSEPH ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
AGGREGATE (Armo Press 1972) (1882); SCOTT, supra note 11, at 441-42; Laski, supra
note 14, at 561; Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before
1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1888).
According to Samuel Williston, "the first English book devoted wholly to the
subject of corporations" was THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS, published anonymously in
1702. Williston, supra at 105, 110 n.2. Before the 1702 publication one has to rely on
what can be extracted from such primary sources as the charters and from other
sources such as law cases. Fortunately for purposes of this discussion, Coke in the
1612 case of Sutton's Hospital enumerated the following as
the essence of a corporation: 1st, Lawful authority of incorporation, and
that may be by four means, viz., . . . by the King's charter .... The
2d . . . are persons to be incorporated .... 3d, A name by which they
are incorporated. 4th, Of a place, for without a place no incorporation
can be made. 5th, By words sufficient in law, but not restrained to any
certain, legal, and prescript forms of words.
Williston, supra at 113 (citations omitted).
145. That historians would have this focus is not surprising. Commercial develop-
ments were generally so exciting at that time that Jamestown was just one further
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scribed the first Jamestown colony in terms of that company's
relationship to the colony. 46 For instance, Wesley F. Craven,
an eminent historian of the Southern colonial period, wrote that
the charter "recognized" the "London Company" as a "company
of adventurers" that shared dual authority with the royal
council over the colony's functions.14 Alexander Brown, who
collected most of the original source material on the Jamestown
colony, asserted that the first charter "incorporated ... two
companies for planting colonies in South and North Virgin-
ia." 148 Echoing Brown, Charles Andrews agreed that the char-
ter "incorporat[ed] two Virginia Companies, one for London and
one for Plymouth."49
These historians have mischaracterized the legal nature of
the "colony." They have implied that a proprietary colony exist-
ed from 1606.15 Perhaps because the Virginia Company
played such an important role after 1609, historians have been
apt to link "company" when it appears in the 1606 documents
with the Virginia Company. To a degree, the link is justified.
instance of those developments.
146. I argue below that the Virginia Company was in 1606 nothing more than a
loose assemblage of men interested in the venture.
147. CRAVEN, supra note 17, at 61-63.
148. 1 GENESIS, supra note 1, at 52 n.1.
149. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 82-83. Not all historians, however, asserted that
the Virginia Company was incorporated in 1606. In his treatise on joint-stock compa-
nies, William Scott wrote that the Virginia Company was "first formally constituted
by the second charter." SCOTT, supra note 11, at 250. Scott declared, however, that "a
corporate character had been assumed three years earlier, as is shown by the opening
of the first court book on January 8th, 1606/7." Id. More recently, Phillip Barbour
described the broad framework for the venture as one in which "[i]nvestment was
solely by individuals, in the corporate form of joint-stock companies, one for each
colony, to be privately managed under the'supervision of a council in London ...
directly responsible to the Crown." 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 15. Both
of these historians were discussing the role of the "company" in managing the com-
mercial, or private, aspect of the venture. Neither was discussing its role in governing
the colony between 1606 and 1609.
Robert Brenner's detailed discussion of the role of the Virginia Company in
colonial development begins with its incorporation in 1609. BRENNER, supra note 9, at
93. Brenner very briefly alludes to the company's earlier existence. Id. at 93-94.
150. The charter of 1609 created a proprietary colony. It declared that it was
"erecting" the company for Virginia into a "corporation." 1 GENESIS, supra note 1, at
208. That body, it stated, "shall be known, called and incorporated by the name of,
The Treasurer and Company of Adventurers and Planters of the City of London for
the First Colony in Virginia." Id. at 229.
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The commercial figures who were major influences before the
Company incorporated in 1609 continued to play major roles
afterwards. From 1606 to 1609, these men formed an unincor-
porated company to organize commercial matters in conjunction
with a local council. After 1609, these same men, having incor-
porated their company, organized matters without the aid of
that council. They centralized power in order to conduct affairs
more efficiently. From an analytical perspective that focuses on
the role of important commercial players, not much appears to
have changed after the second charter. From this perspective,
the precise character of the company and of the colony in the
original documents could interest only legal archaeologists sift-
ing through technical documents to determine a precise defini-
tion. But to dismiss the legal character of the company and the
colony in 1606 as an arcane matter understates how legal insti-
tutions shaped the development of this country.'51
1. The Meaning of "Company"
In the initiating documents, "company" and especially "colo-
ny" had meanings intended to influence the Virginia venture in
the interests of investors. The term "company," which appeared
twice in the charter,'52 directly addressed the private commer-
cial aspect of the venture. Nothing in the "Letters Patent" indi-
cated that "company" referred to anything other than the paten-
tees and their "associates." These groups would combine, under
the aegis of the colony, to engage in the pursuit of a common
end. 5 ' The end was trade, as the "Instructions" later clari-
fied."M The "Instructions" also required the "adventurers" to
151. A reciprocal relationship seems to exist between the legal system and the
larger social system in which it is embedded. Social and economic forces influence the
nature and development of the law and its institutions. But the law and its institu-
tions also influence the nature, the direction and the pace of social change. Here I
emphasize that latter influence because the history of Colonial Virginia has ignored
it.
152. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 24, 29.
153. Id. To eight named individuals and "divers others" of the King's subjects who
were "desirous to divide themselves into two several colonies and companies," the
Charter granted a license. Id. at 24. This language indicates that the King did not
recognize a company as an existing legal entity at the time.
154. Id. at 42.
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"elect and choose out of themselves one or more companies" to
"take charge of the trade" to and from the colony.' The en-
abling documents, consequently, permitted some limited compe-
tition among the backers of the colony. Efficiency in transport-
ing goods to and from the colony and in marketing colonial im-
ports in England would result in economic benefit for those
investing in a particular company. Furthermore, future inves-
tors would then be attracted to that company. Moreover, compe-
tition among companies would reduce prices in England for
items imported from the colony and stimulate demand. The
venture could thereby deflect many of the criticisms that grant-
ing a monopoly to an incorporated company would generate.
The limited competition scheme could counter parliamentary
critics who argued that monopolies pursued their own economic
interests at the expense of the public interest.' 5
The "company" of the first charter was not a legal corporate
entity.'57 The charter granted practically none of the normal
privileges of a corporation to the patentees and their associ-
ates."'58 Furthermore, unlike a charter of incorporation, the
155. Id.
Our will and pleasure is, and we do hereby ordain, that the adventurers
of the said first colony, and plantation shall and may during the said
term of five years elect and choose out of themselves one or more compa-
nies, each company consisting of three persons at the least, who shall be
resident at or near London, or such other place, and places, as the coun-
cil of the colony for the time being, or the most part of them, during the
said five years, shall think fit, who shall from time to time take charge
of the trade . . . and other things, which shall be sent from thence, to
the company of the same colony or plantation in Virginia, and likewise of
all such wares, goods, and merchandises, as shall be brought from the
said colony, or plantation, unto the said place within our realm of Eng-
land, and of all things concerning the managing of the affairs and profits
concerning the adventurers of that company, which shall so pass out of
or come into that place or port.
Id.
156. For further discussion of this matter, see infra text accompanying notes 175-
80.
157. An unincorporated company lacked coercive authority to enforce its rules and
regulations. It could neither transfer privileges when its members died nor transfer
land to successors without making frequent and inconvenient conveyances.
158. The charter did permit the patentees and their associates-if they had a com-
pany-to transport people to Virginia. 1 JAI.STOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 29.
Contrast the first charter with the second charter: The latter declared that those it
names and all others who later join them "shall be one body or commonalty perpetu-
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charter specifically did not denominate any company as a legal
being.'59
2. The Meaning of "Colony"
If "company" might be taken to suggest the Virginia Compa-
ny, "colony" might seem initially to suggest either a quasi-geo-
graphical entity or an administrative area. But the drafters
thought of the "colony" as having a corporate personality, 6 '
similar to an incorporated municipality. Certainly, the charter
did not expressly incorporate the colony. However, precise
words of incorporation were not deemed necessary at the
time. 6' Charters to inhabitants of towns did not always need
a clause of incorporation for the towns to be considered incorpo-
rated. 2 The charter granted most of the privileges and im-
munities associated with boroughs to the "colony."163 Many
have misinterpreted these privileges as having been granted in
1606 to the "company." The charter authorized the colony to act
through its council to "govern and order all matters and causes
which shall arise, grow or happen to or within" the colony."'
al, and shall have perpetual succession, and one common seal." GENESIS, supra note
1, at 229.
159. In defining a corporation, Kyd, in his 1793 treatise on corporation law, states
that it "is a collection of many individuals united in one body, under a special de-
nomination." ANGELL & AMES, supra note 144, at 1.
At the time, trading corporations typically had lengthy official titles. These
titles included "a specified class of persons, formed to carry on a certain enterprize,
and to this a local designation was added, either as applying to the persons or to the
object they had in view." ScOr, supra note 11, at 150. For instance, the title of the
joint-stock company incorporated in 1609 was The Treasurer and Company of Adven-
turers and Planters of the City of London for the First Colony in Virginia. 1 GENESIS,
supra note 1, at 208, 229.
However, not all official names included all of these elements. The matter is
not of purely academic interest. A body incorporated might arguably have ceased to
exist if the local designation mentioned in its title was itself incorporated into a larg-
er body.
160. I borrow the phrases "administrative area" and "corporate personality" from
Laski, supra note 14, at 561, 567.
161. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 144, at 45.
162. Id. at 16.
163. For a general discussion of privileges and immunities granted boroughs see
SUSAN REYNOLDS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH MEDIEVAL TOWNS,
91-181 (1977).
164. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 27.
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To enable the colony to govern itself, the Crown subsequently
issued "Instructions."16' This instrument authorized the
council and its president to "constitute, make and ordain such
constitutions, ordinances and officers, for the better order, gov-
ernment and peace of the people" of their colony. 66 The colony
thereby had the juridical authority, necessary to boroughs and
private corporations, to enable them to execute their functions.
The Council and the president had full judicial "power and
authority to hear and determine all and every... [of-
fense],"167  and "wrongs, trespasses, offenses, and
misdemeanours. " "l They could inflict corporal punishment in-
cluding death, order imprisonment and fines, and award dam-
ages. 69 And, as if to reinforce the colony's authority, the char-
ter granted the council a seal (the usual though not necessary
mode of indicating a body's collective assent).70 Like bor-
oughs, the colony was subject to the superior authority of the
Crown. Its Council had to conduct affairs "according to such
laws, ordinances and Instructions as shall be in that behalf
given and signed with our hand or sign manual and pass under
the privy seal of our realm.""'
The charter of 1606 granted to the "first colony," and not to a
company, other attributes of an incorporated entity. It specifi-
cally named a group as grantees. Such a denomination usually
indicated the incorporation of a body. Gates, Sumers, Hakluyt,
Wingfield and "all such others as are or shall be joined unto
them of that colony," the letters patent declared, "shall be
called the first colony."'72 By entitling unnamed parties, the
165. The "Instructions" were to be read as if incorporated into the charter. It had
declared that the "Instructions" would subsequently be published. Id.
166. Id. at 43.
167. Id. at 38.
168. Id. at 39.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 27. The matter of a seal became an issue in 1623. Sir Thomas Smythe
was accused of not having had a public seal made for the Virginia Company. Until
1619, the company apparently used the seal made for the King's Council of Virginia.
1 GENESIS, supra note 1, at 57 n.1.
171. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 27. Scott notes that the charter is
"wanting in precision, and is to be construed in close relation to the "Instructions." 2
WILLIAM R. SCOTT, THE CONSTrrUTION AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH, SCOTTISH AND IRISH
JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES TO 1740 at 246 (1912) [hereinafter 2 SCOTT].
172. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 25 (emphasis added).
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charter also suggests another characteristic that attaches to an
incorporated legal being-perpetual succession. 173 A grant only
to named patentees expired upon the deaths of those patentees.
The "first colony" to which the named patentees belonged would
be unable to transfer privileges and immunities to others. Nor,
for instance, without frequent and inconvenient conveyances
would the patentees be able to transfer land that they had
received as an unincorporated body to successors. 74 Further-
more, limiting the grant to named patentees would have made
financing the Virginia venture more difficult.
3. The Influence of the Monopoly Controversy on the Enabling
Documents
Why did the proponents of colonization model the colony
upon a municipal corporation? Why, in 1606, did they not incor-
porate as the Virginia Company? To understand the strategy
that the charter implemented, one needs to place it within the
context of the great monopoly controversy of the period. 7 ' The
charter was granted when the theory of English corporations
was striving to reconcile an older, essentially medieval, concep-
tion of the legal status of a corporation with the emerging con-
ception. 7 6 The older theory regarded corporate status as a
form of property. A corporation was entitled to certain monopo-
listic and exclusionary rights that medieval theory held to be
inherent in property. The emerging concept did not rely on the
173. For a brief discussion of perpetual succession, see ANGELL & AMES, supra
note 144, at 6-8.
174. The charter granted "all the lands, woods" and so on in a specified area be-
tween latitudes thirty-four and forty degrees north to the "first colony." 1 JAMESTOWN
VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 25-26. The King also "grant[ed] and agree[d] to and with
the . . . first colony" that he and his successors "upon petition in that behalf to be
made shall . . . give and grant unto such persons, their heirs and assignees as the
council of that colony or the most part of them shall for that purpose nominate and
assign all the lands, tenements and hereditaments which shall be within the precincts
limited for that colony." Id. at 33.
175. See generally SCOTT, supra note 11, at 105-28; William L. Letwin, The English
Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 355 (1954) (both sources presenting
background for the monopoly controversy).
176. For these two concepts, I am indebted to Morton Horwitz's discussion of their
role in eighteenth-century English legal theory. MORTON HoRWiTZ, THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 109-10 (1992).
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property theory to justify granting monopolistic and
exclusionary privileges to a corporation. Instead, it emphasized
the public character of those privileges. Consequently, the theo-
ry defined corporate status as the limited grant of a public
privilege.
For several decades before the drafting of the charter, critics
had stridently attacked chartered monopoly companies. 7 Crit-
ics, especially in Parliament, charged Queen Elizabeth I with
freely dispensing charters to monopoly companies.17 Critics
objected primarily to the arbitrary "political power which the
Crown exercised in granting" monopolies. 9 Additionally, they
objected to the economic effects of monopolies. Parliamentary
critics accused monopoly companies of vigorously pursuing prof-
its for their members and ignoring the public purpose of man-
aging the trade in which they were engaged for the benefit of
the public.8 In that climate, refusing a charter to the compa-
ny seemed a prudent policy to both the King and the propo-
nents of colonization.
From the King's perspective, the structure chosen was not as
likely to provoke a dispute over whether the King or Parlia-
ment had the authority to grant charters. 8' Parliament was
unlikely to raise the issue of prerogative on the highly specula-
tive matter of possible trade with a largely unknown place. 8 '
From the perspective of backers of the venture, the structure,
177. For a discussion of an even earlier instance of such criticisms, see Laski,
supra note 14, at 561, 587.
178. Letwin, supra note 175, at 363.
179. Id. at 359.
180. For the role of the early corporation as a "public agency," see Williston, supra
note 144, at 110-11.
181. The notion that authority rested with parliament had been established by
1605-1606, when the first charter was being drafted. In 1603, the "Case of Monopo-
lies," Darcy v. Allen established the principle that a monopoly granted by royal pat-
ent would be invalid. Letwin, supra note 175, at 363 (citing Darcy v. Allen, 74 Eng.
Rep. 1131 (KB. 1602)); see also id. at 359; SCOTT, supra note 11, at 105-06. In his
Introduction to English Legal History, J.H. Baker says that Darcy was decided in
1602-the difference may be in the use of old or new style of dating. BAKER, supra
note 15, at 512-13.
182. Because the venture was so speculative, many members of Parliament proba-
bly would not have objected to a monopoly for a limited time. They regarded opening
up a new area of foreign trade "as resembling an invention, and as such, entitled to
a monopoly for a number of years." SCOTT, supra note 11, at 124.
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consisting of a local council in Virginia and limited competition
among companies, enabled them to avoid in England the charge
of narrow self-interest. When the privileges of mere trading
monopolies were under attack, the charter could not have
granted broad concessions to a company motivated by greater
ambitions than trade without generating considerable controver-
sy.
Ironically, the structure that the charter provided applied
more broadly than it would have had it merely been incorporat-
ed as a company. In contrast to an incorporated monopoly, the
charter directly affected more people and activities. Just as
charters had enabled municipal corporations to exercise "a min-
ute supervision over the inhabitants" of towns," 3 the first
charter permitted the colony to exercise a similar control. Even
a casual reading of the charter and the "Instructions" reveals
the means."M The constitution, laws, and ordinances of that
colony bound all individuals entering it.' 85 However, the by-
laws of a company would have bound only its members. In
contrast, the grant of a monopoly would have directly affected
those nonmembers seeking to engage in the same activity for
which the company had incorporated. A traditional incorporated
company would not have had the authority to bar persons not
engaging in the protected activity from the territory. Nor would
it have had authority to control other activities. On the other
hand, the enabling documents provided patentees and their
associates in the "first colony" with broad authority to control
all persons and activities in Virginia. They could control access
to the colony, and if they effectively exercised their right to
choose the first council,'86 they could presumably control sub-
sequent councils. Not incorporating a monopoly company would
seem to have denied proponents a major lure in attracting
investors. A monopoly on trade with the colony was, of course,
the major attraction. Nevertheless, the charter indirectly ob-
tained the economic protection that a monopoly would have
directly secured. A monopoly could have prohibited all people
183. Williston, supra note 144, at 108.
184. See 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 38-39, 43.
185. Id. at 43.
186. Id. at 29-30.
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not of the colony from trading with the colony. But the charter
did not expressly prohibit anyone from trading there. Instead it
permitted the colony to tax indefinitely the value of goods that
others "trafficked, bought or sold" within its "limits and pre-
cincts." 8 ' As a barrier to entry into trade with the colony, the
tax could effectively create a monopoly. Essentially, the tax
would protect the investors who would bear the initial risk by
reassuring them that other investors could not subsequently
capture the trade previously developed.
As described above, the documents defused the charged issue
of monopolies. At the same time, by empowering the colony as
though it were a municipal borough, the documents provided
the backers of colonization with greater powers and privileges
than those available through incorporation. This achievement
reveals the influence and skill of the legal minds present
among the colony's proponents and the documents' drafters. Sir
John Popham, Edward Coke, and other legal figures certainly
understood the legal status of municipal boroughs which had
been around, at least in inchoate form, since Anglo-Saxon
times.'88 Popham and Coke were also experts in the monopoly
controversy. Popham knew the principle established in Darcy v.
Allen. 9 that a royal grant of a monopoly was generally inval-
id. 9" As Lord Chief Justice, Popham had been a member of
the Court of the King's Bench that had decided Darcy.9' Ed-
ward Coke opposed monopolies because he believed they were
contrary to the public good. In Davenant v. Hurdis,9' Coke
argued that monopolies raised prices, caused unemployment,
and burdened the relief system. 93 Coke's arguments offer an
explanation as to why the "Instructions" permitted several com-
panies to compete in trading. As a champion of parliament's
187. Id. at 30.
188. See REYNOLDS, supra note 163, at 92-98.
189. Darcy v. Allen, 74 Eng. Rep. 1131 (KB. 1602).
190. Id. at 1137.
191. Id. at 1131. The court unanimously held that a royal patent granting a mo-
nopoly was invalid. Id. at 1137. Monopolies, the court reasoned, restrain trade and
lead to increased prices and reduced quality. Id. at 1138.
192. Davenant v. Hurdis, 72 Eng. Rep. 769 (KB. 1599).
193. Id. at 770-71. See also Coke's transaction, SIR EDWARD COKE, The Case of
Monopolies, in VI THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, 85, 86-87 (George Wilson
trans. 1777).
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cause, Coke also favored a participatory council rather than a
governorship.
III. THE STRUCTURE OF PROPERTY RELATIONS
Any scheme for governing Virginia could never be implement-
ed without substantial capital from investors. Without a large
initial contribution, proponents would not have been able to
recruit settlers and transport them to Virginia. Moreover, they
would have had to rely upon investors for a considerable period
until the colony was secure. But in Virginia's uncertain circum-
stances, investors had little prospect of immediate return. Con-
sequently, protecting investors' interests drove the planning
process. The needs of settlers were subordinate." So after ad-
194. In a recent article, Robert Ellickson asserted that "the settlers declined to
establish private property" in order to distribute risks. Ellickson, supra note 2, at
1315, 1341. I agree that dispersing risk explains the "impetus for the initial collectiv-
ization of land at [Jamestown]." Id. But I do not agree that it was the settlers who
decided to adopt a communal property system. As this article shows, the planners
imposed that scheme upon settlers for the benefit of investors. Advocates of coloniza-
tion adopted the joint stock scheme, primarily to alleviate the concerns of a merchant
class that did not want to invest in colonization.
To argue that the settlers proposed the scheme implemented at Jamestown
makes no sense. That scheme would have deterred most potential settlers. It provided
little incentive to go to Virginia. It offered settlers for their first five years in the
colony the guarantee of food and shelter. Anything they produced beyond that amount
accrued to the investors. If the settlers survived the deadly conditions that Ellickson
described, id. at 1336, 1342, and if the council nominated them, they might be grant-
ed land at the end of those five years. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 33.
In addition, settlers could also have nothing material to show for their labor. A po-
tential settler evaluating the risks in going to Virginia would quickly calculate that
were he to go, he should contribute only enough labor to survive. He would gain
nothing by contributing more. In fact, settlers who did go in the first voyage contrib-
uted only what they needed to survive. See generally 1-2 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra
note 1 (recounting some of the first settlers' stories).
Furthermore, the social composition of the first settlers indicates that the tem-
porary communal property scheme discouraged potential settlers. The first colonists
included a disproportionate number of gentlemen. For lists of the first planters, with
a contemporaneous description of their social standing or occupation, see SAM 4S, supra
note 52 at 809-13; SMITH, supra note 119, at 140-42; STUDLEY, supra note 119, at
207-09 (29 of the 67 people were labeled "gentlemen"). Some of these gentlemen
brought servants in an attempt to insulate them from risk. Consequently, the scheme
probably did not discourage these "gentlemen" to the extent that it would appear to
have discouraged more suitable potential settlers. See discussion infra part III.B.d.
(discussing other factors discouraging settlers).
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dressing how to govern the colony in the best interests of the
investors, the proponents next sought to structure property
relations so that investors would receive as expeditious a return
on their contributions as possible.'95 To attain that goal, pro-
ponents examined forms of organizing foreign trade ventures
because many of the circumstances surrounding trade and colo-
nization were similar. They considered individual ventures,
partnerships, regulated companies, and joint-stock compa-
nies. 9 ' Colonizing was more complex than trading because it
required more capital, involved more risks, and demanded
greater commitment and more intellectual resources. Coloniza-
tion required founding a society. The planners' ultimate choice
determined not only property relations, but also labor and ex-
ternal relations with both investors and Indians. That choice
also defined crime in each colony. In short, in selecting among
various forms of organization, the planners were selecting
among different conceptions of the appropriate society for Vir-
ginia.
Had settlers determined the property scheme, they would have protected their
own interests. At a lower cost, settlers could have achieved all the benefits that
Ellickson said motivated them to choose the communal scheme. Ellickson, supra note
2, at 1342. For instance, a system granting land to individual settlers could have
efficiently addressed the settlers' concerns. In return for land, settlers would remit a
portion of their profits to the cape merchant. He, in turn, would distribute a portion
to investors. But the cape merchant would also retain a portion to guarantee settlers
the means of survival should their health fail, their plot of land be infertile, or their
farming methods be inadequate. Furthermore, the settlers could have postponed allo-
cating land until they had fortified themselves, thereby exploiting the returns to scale
created by public works.
Finally, I am not convinced that Ellickson can rely upon the communal proper-
ty system adopted in Jamestown for historical evidence to ground his more theoretical
conclusions about property in land. At Jamestown, communal property was imposed
upon settlers who were forced to implement it. The system provided little incentive to
work. It was intended to be only temporary, which ultimately undermined the
settlers' commitment to it. The evidence indicates that the settlers were never com-
mitted to such a scheme.
195. In what would strike one today as extraordinary commingling, the initiating
documents address matters of both public and private law. These documents, like
others of the earliest colonial period, set "a precedent for merging private and public
law which would continue in the colonies long after the charters themselves had been
superseded by other legal arrangements." PETER C. HOFFER, LAW AND PEOPLE IN CO-
LONIAL AMERICA 13 (1992).
196. This discussion relies on ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 39-45; HOLDERNESS, su-
pra note 14, at 132-39; SCOTT, supra note 11, at 15-63, 105-65.
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A. Private Funding of Colonization
For two reasons those advocating colonization probably con-
sidered relying on individuals who would act singly or in small
partnerships. First, the English had the most experience with
that model. Since 1500, merchants had conducted most English
foreign trade.197 Moreover, in situations similar to Virginia,
English mercantile interests relied upon individual enterprise.
To gain a foothold in Africa during the mid-sixteenth century,
those interests had turned to individual merchants.198 Because
individual expeditions were least likely to antagonize the Por-
tuguese already ensconced in Africa, merchants did not seek a
charter.'99 Once they had gained access, the merchants for-
mally organized trade.00 Second, proposals to undertake the
private colonization of Virginia circulated in 1605."' Sir John
Zouche drafted the "Articles of Agreement" with Captain George
Weymouth to send two hundred men to settle Virginia."'
Zouche's view of property relations was essentially feudal. He
intended to hold land as "Lord Paramount," or chief feudal
proprietor, a title traditionally bestowed in England on the
Crown.20' He also intended to be sole proprietor.0 4 Unlike
earlier patentees, Zouche apparently did not intend to grant
197. Merchants "acting on their own account, singly or in small partnerships, un-
protected by any form of limited liability" conducted most English foreign trade be-
tween 1500 and 1750. HOLDERNESS, supra note 14, at 132. Merchants "resorted to-
gether in regular trade in ad hoc associations for a particular voyage, but they re-
mained accountable as individuals to their creditors." Id. at 132. Incorporating was
very expensive. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 42.
198. SCoTT, supra note 11, at 21.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See KINGSBURY, supra note 55, at 17. The proposals were those of Zouche and
of the Earl of Southampton.
202. See 1 GENESIS, supra note 1, at 33-35.
203. Id. at 34.
204. Until 1606, proprietary grants had been the practice for North America. Such
had been the grants to Sir Humphrey Gilbert in 1578 and Sir Walter Raleigh in
1584. The Letters Patent to Walter Raleigh stated: "Walter Raleigh, his heirs and
assigns and every of them shall have, hold, occupy and enjoy . . . forever all the soil
of all such lands, countries and territories so to be discovered or possessed . . . with
full power to dispose thereof and of every parte in fee simple or otherwise according
to the laws of England as near as the same conveniently may be ... " 1 THE
ROANOKE VOYAGES, supra note 11, at 83-84.
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parcels of land to major backers of his scheme to hold indepen-
dently."5 In Zouche's hierarchical and centralized scheme, ev-
eryone would have a clearly defined subordinate status. Prob-
ably because Popham in particular opposed his scheme,0 6
Zouche progressed no further than drawing up the "Agree-
ment."207 In any event, given that the feudal system had
ceased in England,0 8 Zouche would have struggled to entice
all but the most desperate or the most ignorant to settle Vir-
ginia.
Private ventures such as Zouche's were also encountering
more general opposition. Investors did not want to tie their
capital to the fortunes of one individual. Problems could arise if
that individual died and his heirs had no interest in the pro-
ject. Also, lucrative opportunities might distract the individual
in question, especially if his own money or credit was running
out. For instance, when privateering seemed more profitable
than colonizing, Walter Raleigh abandoned, in 1590, his almost
decade-long attempt to establish a colony at Roanoke Is-
land.20 9
For reasons such as these, advocates "of a public stock" for
colonizing organized to oppose "private" funding.210 They pro-
moted public funding because it would attract "better men of
[belhavior and quality,"21 and generate work for the youngest
sons of gentlemen,1 2 thereby enabling the colony to "continue
205. To finance their expeditions, patentees such as Sir Humphrey Gilbert granted
extensive parcels of land to prospective wealthy investors. After Gilbert started the
practice in the 1580's, it became increasingly common "as a means to underwrite the
highly speculative business of American development." CRAVEN, supra note 17, at 36.
206. See supra text accompanying note 45.
207. 1 GENESIS, supra note 1, at 32-35. We do not know whether Zouche ever sub-
mitted his proposal to the Crown. A fire in 1619 destroyed the Privy Council register
for the period from 1603 to 1613, eliminating any evidence that the register may
have contained. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 82.
208. By 1500, the feudal system was "virtually a dead letter in England." BAKER,
supra note 15, at 214. See generally, ALAN MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH
INDIVIDUALISM: THE FAMILY, PROPERTY AND SOCIAL TRANSITION (1978).
209. 2 THE ROANOKE VOYAGES, supra note 11, at 598.
210. KINGSBURY, supra note 55, at 17-18. A brief drafted by opponents entitled
Reasons or Motives for the Raising of a Public Stock appears in 1 GENESIS, supra
note 1, at 37-42.
211. 1 GENESIS, supra note 1, at 38.
212. Id. at 40. These men were among the most geographically mobile members of
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in better obedience, and become more industrious."21 "Better
men" would enhance the "[rieputation and opinion of the enter-
prise." " Their financial contribution and their presence in the
colony would attract new investors, while reassuring them that
the colony was promoting values that investors approved.
B. Joint Stocks
Many of the reasons advanced by advocates of public funding
influenced the plans for Virginia. To govern property relations,
the planners ultimately settled on the joint-stock format. This
format was a mid-sixteenth century innovation in English com-
mercial enterprise.215 In a joint stock organization, partici-
pants pooled resources, and anyone willing to subscribe could
participate. Each participant acquired a share or shares in the
venture."1 ' Shareholders then enjoyed the profits or bore loss-
es proportionately.217 The joint-stock format was superior to
all other models in generating the initial capital necessary for
an overseas enterprise. The joint stock format therefore had an
important advantage over the regulated company, an older form
of company.218 Participants in a joint stock did not need to
society. MACFARLANE, supra note 208, at 62-79. Consequently, they were likely emi-
grants to Virginia because they believed it was easier to attain greater status and
wealth in Virginia than in England.
213. 1 GENESIS, supra note 1, at 38.
214. Id. at 40.
215. Though the joint-stock format first appeared in the mid-sixteenth century,
other forms of organization dated back to the medieval period. SCOTT, supra note 11,
at 1.
According to Charles M. Andrews, the joint stock system "became the starting
point in the development of the colonial system of government." ANDREWS, supra note
4, at 41.
Many of the extant descriptions of life in early Jamestown explain and defend
behavior in terms of the relations that the joint stock organization established. That
organization has crucially formed our present understanding of life in Jamestown.
216. See infra text accompanying notes 221-23 (discussing what "a share" meant at
the time).
217. Joint stocks were of two types-temporary, or terminable, and permanent. The
accounts of temporary stocks were settled at the end of an expedition. A further
expedition required issuance of a new joint stock. SCOTT, supra note 11, at 45; see id
at 153 (discussing the "divisions" that occurred when stocks terminated).
218. The regulated company "was a kind of partnership, composed of a group of
persons, incorporated by a royal letters patent, enjoying as individuals the monopoly
of a certain trade." ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 40. To join, members paid an admis-
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pass a test demonstrating that they were "bred to the trade."
Consequently, joint stocks were open to investors eager to capi-
talize on profitable foreign trade opportunities but barred from
regulated companies because they were not properly "bred to
the trade." A joint stock venture ensured a surer source of capi-
tal because it did not depend upon the financial stability of one
individual or of a group of partners.
For those planning the Virginia enterprise, the joint-stock
format had other important economic advantages. Pooling the
resources of many contributors enabled larger ventures than
those otherwise possible. Because both individual merchants
and merchants in regulated companies managed their capital
separately, they necessarily limited the size of any venture they
could undertake. Pooling resources also permitted joint-stock
companies to attain lower administrative and transaction costs
than could individuals, partnerships or regulated companies.
Unlike individuals, members of regulated companies, and part-
ners, participants in a joint stock controlled but did not person-
ally manage the enterprise.219 Instead, they relied upon pro-
fessionals, thereby cutting both administrative and transaction
costs.
22 °
Joint stocks also dispersed risk efficiently because they could
attract a broad range of investors. The financial failure of any
one shareholder was not likely to doom the entire venture.
However, because of the risk to individual investors, the format
sion fee and passed a test demonstrating that they were "bred to the trade." Id. They
then agreed to rules binding their commercial dealings, but were allowed to manage
their own capital. Two of the most famous regulated companies were the Merchant
Adventurers and the Merchant Staplers. Id.
The regulated company shed some light on governing relations among the Eng-
lish abroad. Some companies were entitled to select a governor to settle disputes
among English merchants in the countries where they traded. For instance, a 1391
grant to merchants trading with Prussia granted members that privilege. SCOTT,
supra note 11, at 8.
219. SCOTT, supra note 11, at 45. Partnerships demanded that partners closely
involve themselves in the business. They also required that all partners assent to any
action in relation to the trade. A partner, for instance, could not dispose of a share
without the other partners' consent. Id. at 442.
220. For example, Virginia planners sought to reduce transaction costs by permit-
ting only "some few" to represent the colony in trading with the Indians. See 1
JAIIESTOVN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 51.
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had very serious drawbacks which the planners for Virginia
had to confront. In the colonial period a share meant something
very different from what it means today. A share was "an ap-
preciable part of the whole undertaking," and not "a multiple of
units of capital."22 The number of shares in a company was
fixed, but the amount of each share could vary. Today, the
denomination of a share is fixed, but the number of shares may
change depending on the success of the company.222 In other
words, joint-stock companies "did not offer a species of limited
liability and participants could be called upon in law for more
than their share capital in the event of foreclosure."228
Attracting investors to joint stock for Virginia was a daunting
challenge. The venture was both risky and expensive. A long
time would elapse before returns were received. In the
meantime, shareholders could have had to contribute unexpect-
edly large amounts. To secure capital, planners had to convince
cautious investors that the risk was as low as possible.
Unfortunately, details of the joint stock format adopted in
Virginia are sparse. Historians do not know which of the two
types of joint stocks, temporary or terminable and permanent,
the proponents chose.224 The former would limit the time that
an investor could be exposed to risk because investors would
settle accounts when a specified event occurred. 5 In Virginia,
such an event might have been the return of ships from the
first voyage. Further voyages would then have required a new
joint stock. Historians also do not know how widely the propo-
nents sought investors. The initiating documents did not call for
an appeal to the public. Likewise, no promotional material
221. SCOTT, supra note 11, at 45.
222. Id. at 44.
223. HOLDERNESS, supra note 14, at 135.
224. Temporary stocks were the most common type in the sixteenth century.
SCOTT, supra note 11, at 62. The East India Company during its first fifty years was
a joint-stock company of the temporary type. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 40.
Letters from London to Virginia in 1608 indicate that each voyage was expect-
ed to pay for its own expenses, and if any suffered serious loss, no further capital
would be available.
2 SCOTT, supra note 171, at 249. These letters implied that the format was tempo-
rary. See ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 88.
225. See ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 45.
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inviting the public to subscribe to the joint stock exists. Conse-
quently, we must assume that only the group surrounding
Popham and the patentees participated in the joint stock. Noth-
ing, however, prohibited that group from inviting others to par-
ticipate.
1. Protecting the Investors
Despite the dearth of detail on the joint stock system, the
initiating documents reveal how planners shifted much of the
risk inherent in the format from the investors to the settlers.
To ensure a quick return for investors, the joint stock principle
was extended to each settler for a limited period. For five years
after arriving in Virginia, every settler had to:
[Tirade together all in one stock, or divideably, but in two,
or three stocks at the most, and bring not only all the
fruits of their labors there, but also all such other goods
and commodities, which shall be brought out of England or
any other place into the same colonies, into several maga-
zines or storehouses.226
Likewise, land in Virginia was subject to the joint stock princi-
ple. Nobody could privately use land for the first five years that
a person spent in Virginia.
These provisions aimed to assure investors that everything
the settlers produced, beyond that which satisfied the settlers'
immediate needs, would accrue to the investors' benefit. These
provisions also seemed to guarantee settlers the means of sur-
vival. However, settlers had to invest five years of labor in a
hostile environment before they could work solely for their own
benefit. In these circumstances, extending the joint stock princi-
ple to land minimized the risks for investors by ensuring an
early return for their contribution to the venture. The particu-
lar source of that return did not interest them.
226. 1 JAIESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 40. The adventurers could "elect and
choose out of themselves one or more Companies . .. [to] take charge of the trade,
and .. . other things, which shall be sent from thence, to the company . . . in Vir-
ginia, and likewise of all such wares, goods, and merchandises, as shall be
brought ... within our realm of England." Id. at 42.
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Had investors individually been allotted land in the colony,
the venture might have appealed primarily to experienced land-
holders.2 7 But, as the planners knew, landed class investors
had a dismal record of supporting efforts to colonize during the
late sixteenth century. 28 The landed class initiated, financed,
and led both Gilbert's and Raleigh's initial attempts to establish
colonies in North America.229 However, in both ventures, the
original sponsors failed to continue their support."' The mer-
chant class also did not want to invest in colonizing.2 1 Conse-
quently, the planners had to appeal to a broad range of inves-
tors.
In a system of private allotments, each investor would have
to bear the risk that the land allotted to him would not be
fertile. Moreover, English agricultural methods might not be
suited to land in Virginia. Additionally, each investor would
have to bear all the costs and risks of providing laborers who
might not remain healthy and who might desert the project.1 2
Holding land communally forced each investor to bear a share
of those risks. And, it also guaranteed each a minimum return
from the most productive land.
The joint stock scheme adopted for Virginia did have risks for
investors. Settlers collectively might not work as diligently on
communal land as they might upon their own land. In addition,
some individuals would probably be freeriders. All in all, apply-
ing the joint stock principle to land seemed to guarantee inves-
tors at least some return even though that return would take
longer than in a private property system.
227. Patentees such as Sir Humphrey Gilbert had allotted land to wealthy inves-
tors in order to help them finance expeditions. CRAVEN, supra note 17, at 36.
228. See BRENNER supra note 9, at 108-09.
229. Id. at 108.
230. Id.
231. See supra notes 94-104 and accompanying text. A "mere £37,000" was contrib-
uted to the joint stock of the Virginia Company from its incorporation in 1609 to its
dissolution in 1624. BRENNER, supra note 9, at 107. This was "a trivial sum for com-
mercial ventures in this period." Id. By contrast, from 1609 until 1621, "the East
India Company raised over £2,000,000 for its joint stock." Id. at 97.
232. Some settlers in Virginia apparently brought laborers, indentured servants,
with them. The London Council's "Instructions Given by Way of Advice" mentions
that "workm[e]n may belong to any private persons." 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra
note 1, at 49, 53.
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The planners could have opted for an alternative private
property scheme in which individual farmers, not investors,
would receive land. In return, landholders would have had to
remit to the investors either a portion of their profits or a fixed.
amount for a set period. The machinery for organizing and
enforcing the former scheme was not in place in 1606.233 The
company loosely gathered around the patentees had not incor-
porated and apparently, for political reasons, did not plan on
incorporating in the future." Organizing, implementing, mon-
itoring, and enforcing such a scheme would have imposed con-
siderable administrative costs. 5 A far more elaborate organi-
zation was necessary to monitor this type of system.
Requiring landholders to remit a portion of their profits
would also have granted individual farmers considerable discre-
tion to determine the correct portion. Farmers would pay them-
selves first and would then worry about paying investors. To
avoid being defrauded, investors or their agents would have to
be constantly vigilant. Presumably, investors would recover the
land if individuals defaulted. However, recovering land was not
the best solution, because it left investors holding an asset that
they could not accurately evaluate. Furthermore, it would post-
pone a return, impose new search and transportation costs, and
leave the risk unaddressed. Consequently, investors could de-
cide to cut their losses and abandon the enterprise. The de-
faults of both farmers and investors would then discourage
prospective investors during the colony's crucial start-up period.
A fixed payment scheme would also not have appealed to
either settlers or investors. This approach would have been too
risky given the uncertain knowledge of farming conditions in
Virginia. No one would want to commit to a fixed amount in
advance. On the one hand, the amount could be so high that it
233. Such a scheme was, in fact, adopted in 1619 when the Virginia Company al-
lowed farmers to work common land for three years, paying one-fourth of their profits
to the Company. When the three-year period expired, the farmer had two years' with-
in which to procure a grant of the land farmed. Lynda L. Butler, The Commons Con-
cept: A Historical Concept with Modern Relevance, 23 WVIM. & MARY L. REV. 835, 872
(1982).
234. None of the available documents indicated an intention to incorporate.
235. For instance, to enforce the scheme, agents might have been required to audit
individual farmers.
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would discourage farmers from going to Virginia. For those who
did go, a high amount could provide an incentive to abandon
the land. On the other hand, if the land proved as fruitful as
some earlier reports had claimed, a fixed amount might offer
investors a ridiculously low return.
The joint stock scheme structured property relations in favor
of the investors. Individual settlers could not determine how
much of what they produced to retain for themselves and how
much to remit to investors. Settlers had to surrender all crops
to the cape merchant who would ration necessities to all."3
Consequently, individuals would have to overcome the presump-
tion that anything they possessed that was not accounted for on
the cape merchant's books was communal property wrongfully
retained.
The joint stock format also transferred primary responsibility
for dealing with shirking and freeriding from the investors to
the settlers. This problem could cause settlers not to produce
enough crops to satisfy both their own immediate needs and
the demands of investors. To solve this problem, the cape mer-
chant or the council had the authority to reduce rations for the
settlers and pay investors a constant return."7 Consequently,
all settlers would bear the cost of freeriders. This result would
give the community an incentive to pressure freeriders into
working. The initiating documents granted the council the
means to deal formally with the freerider problem. 8 But if
settlers were, as the planners intended, a relatively homoge-
neous group, they could also enforce appropriate behavior
through less formal, but equally effective, means such as ostra-
cizing the offending settler. The initial group was small enough
that such methods might work.
236. 1 JAMESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 41-42.
237. Id. at 42.
238. Id. at 40.
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2. English Property Relations and the Settlers' Attitude
Toward Joint Stocks
The allocation of risk in Virginia discouraged potential set-
tlers. Similarly, so did the restrictions on their geographic and
social mobility. The planners underestimated the degree of
economic independence that property relations in England had
generated. Compared to the possibilities that property relations
in England permited, those available in Virginia seemed ex-
tremely limited.
In England, freeholders and copyholders held most of the
land."9  They could effectively give, grant, or will their
land." They believed themselves free to acquire and dispose
of property as they wished.24' The freedom to alienate implied
a concomitant freedom of movement. 2 Because property own-
239. In the medieval era a freeholder was a man defined as a free man, not as a
villein, holding a freehold estate. CORNELIus J. MOYNIHAN, Introduction to the Law of
Real Property 9, 13 (2d ed. 1988). The character of the services required to be ren-
dered one's lord distinguished a freeman from a villein. Id. at 9. The freehold estates
were a fee simple, a fee tail, and a life estate. Id. at 25. These estates were "the
only estates recognized by the law and given protection by the King's courts." Id. at
25.
Villeins held copyhold tenure. Id. at 14. Through the thirteenth century, villeins
held land the will of the lord. Id. at 13. During the fourteenth century, however, "the
obligations of the villein tenants became fixed by manorial customs so that ... [they]
no longer depended on the lord's will." Eventually customary tenure evolved into
copyholder tenure under which 'the rights of such tenants were evidenced by the
records of the manorial courts." Id. The term "copyhold" comes from the copy given to
the tenant of the record of land transfer entered on the rolls of the manorial courts.
Id.
"About one third of all English land was held by copyhold tenures in the early
seventeenth century." MACFARLANE, supra note 208, at 83. In most respects, copyhold
tenure equated to freehold tenure. Both offered similar security of tenure, and the
small fixed fines imposed on copyholders were not unduly burdensome.
240. The Statute of Wills enacted in 1540 granted the legal right to dispose by
will of freeholds. BAKER, supra note 15, at 218. "[B]y the late sixteenth century a
copyholder could sell or grant away his land, or he could surrender it to the lord 'to
the use of his will.' In this he could specify his heirs." MACFARLANE, supra note 208,
at 84.
241. In fact, they often did not exercise the freedom to alienate, especially to dis-
pose of property outside the family, and particularly at death. But not exercising that
freedom does not undermine its legal existence nor does it undermine its importance
in shaping the development of English, and ultimately North American, societies.
242. See generally ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 56; PHILIP J. GREVEN, JR., FOUR
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ers could dispose of their property, many children left home
early to make their own way in the world. The possibility of
owning land and owning more and better land encouraged indi-
viduals to relocate. Land owners were often willing to sell their
property and assume the risk of moving to a place where condi-
tions could vary. The willingness to pursue economic opportuni-
ty engendered an adaptability in individuals that should have
encouraged some to move to Virginia.
The structure of property relations in land had also generat-
ed in the English an unusual receptivity to change and an
entrepreneurial spirit that should have promoted movement to
Virginia. Unlike on the continent, land ownership alone often
improved an individual's social standing. Social mobility was
based on wealth in addition to blood.243 In France and Germa-
ny, wealth did not permit the same degree of mobility. In the
former, "special rights ... relating to private law, criminal law
and fiscal law" differentiated the nobility from the rest of soci-
ety.' In the latter, jurists elaborately classified the upper
echelons of the social hierarchy. 5 In England, however, the
common law essentially treated all Englishmen equally. After
the thirteenth century, common law did not distinguish among
free men. 46 Villeinage was "almost the only real class." ' 7
Consequently, even though the English legal system may not
have actively facilitated upward mobility among classes, it cer-
tainly erected few, if any, direct impediments.
Surprisingly, opportunities for mobility were to be severely
restricted in Virginia, at least initially. No one was to assume
immediate private possession of land. In fact, even Edward
GENERATIONS: POPULATION, AND FAMILY IN COLONIAL ANDOVER, MASSACHUSETTS 267-
68 (1970) (discussing high geographical mobility of seventeenth century England);
MACFARLANE, supra note 208, at 62-79 (discussing mobility in sixteenth- and seven-
teenth-century England).
243. MACFARLANE, supra note 208, at 165.
244. MARC BLOCH, LAND AND WORK IN MEDIAEVAL EUROPE 65 (J.E. Anderson
trans., 1967).
245. Id. at 65-66. "They pictured a kind of ladder, each class having its own fixed
place on one of the rungs. No one belonging to any one of these groups could, with-
out loss of caste, accept a fief from a man lower down the scale." Id. at 66.
246. Id. at 65.
247. Id.
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Wingfield, the only patentee in Virginia, was not deeded land
individually.248 The charter was silent on when land could be
held in private tenure. The "Instructions" implied that no
grants would occur for at least five years.249 Only after five
years could settlers acquire land, and then only if the council in
Virginia nominated them. °
Moreover, despite the charter's reassurance that property
relations in Virginia would eventually be as they were in Eng-
land,"' settlers could not act independently. Settlers had to
satisfy the demands of the joint stock. The council in Virginia,
like the feudal lords of old, could also demand all kinds of work
and expel and punish all who did not conform. The charter
promised socage tenure;252 but, the settlers noted the echoes of
early villeinage that resonated in the property scheme it de-
scribed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Motivated by the possibility of governing themselves, by their
conception of property relations, and by the large quantity of
"unpossessed" land in Virginia, many Englishmen, especially
the landless, saw an opportunity to improve their lot in Ameri-
ca. However, as the difficulty in recruiting the first settlers sug-
gests, many Englishmen doubted that opportunity initially.
Many factors explain the initial reticence: the failure of all
previous English attempts to settle North America, the risk of a
Spanish attack on the proposed colony, and the obvious dangers
mentioned at the beginning of this article. Certainly, the
248. The charter did not grant land to any specified individual. 1 JAMEsTOWN
VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 24-34.
249. "[Flor the space of five years next after their first landing," everybody had to
"trade together all in one stock.. . and bring ...all the fruits of their labors" to a
common storehouse. Id. at 40.
250. Lands were to be distributed and divided amongst the undertakers and the
settlers "in such manner and form and for such estates as shall be ordered and set
down by the council of the same colony." Id. at 33.
251. Settlers would hold land of the Crown in free and common socage. It was to
be "had and inherited and enjoyed," as "in the like estates" land was to "be had and
enjoyed by the [laws, within this realm of England." Id. at 37. Some dispute has
existed over the precise kind of tenure permitted by the charter. See ANDREWS, supra
note 4, at 86-87 n.1; W. Hamilton Bryson, English Common Law in Virginia, 6 J.
LEGAL HIST. 249, 252 (1985).
252. 1 JAmESTOWN VOYAGES, supra note 1, at 37.
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charter's suspension of the known structure of property rela-
tions adversely affected the flow of settlers. The suspension also
partly explains why investors were particularly cautious-many
recognized that property relations provided little incentive to
settlers to provide investors a speedy return.253
Despite the charter's reassurances that property relations in
Virginia would eventually be as they were in England, the
initiating documents clearly declared that property relations
would be different. Suspending the possibility of acquiring land
for five years and surrendering all profits they could gain from
their labor ran counter to the expectations of most English
people. Virginia posed a daunting challenge in that it was un-
known. Against this backdrop, the unusual system of proposed
property relations must certainly have intensified the obvious
differences between living in England and living in Virginia.
The proposed system alone must have caused many not to gam-
ble their lives and fortunes.
253. See supra note 194 and text accompanying notes 226-36.
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